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CRIMINAL DOCTRINES OF FAITH
DAVID JAROS *
Abstract: Decisions like Miranda v. Arizona helped popularize a conception
of the courts as a protector of criminal defendants and a bulwark against overly aggressive law enforcement. But from arrest through trial, the U.S. Supreme Court has fashioned criminal constitutional procedure with a deep and
abiding faith in the motivations of the criminal justice system’s actors. Even
decisions that vindicate individual constitutional rights at the expense of police and prosecutorial power are shaped by the Court’s fundamental trust in
those same actors. They establish, in essence, “Criminal Doctrines of Faith.”
Criminal Doctrines of Faith pervade each stage of the criminal process—from
cases that govern the pursuit of suspects and searches of homes to the disclosure of exculpatory evidence and the defendant’s capacity to waive a jury trial.
This faith in law enforcement takes several forms. Some decisions reflect a
simple faith in the character of police and prosecutors, but others reflect faith
in the institutions in which they work or in the courts’ ability to identify and
deter misconduct. Recent high-profile prosecutions of police officers have
highlighted and raised new questions about how much criminal procedure
should rest on faith. In such cases, trusted government actors, both police and
prosecutors, have attacked the integrity of a criminal process ostensibly designed to control their own behavior. Using the trials of the Baltimore police
officers charged in the death of Freddie Gray as a lens, this Article highlights
how the Supreme Court’s faith in police and prosecutors raises profound questions about the strength of these doctrines, the importance of more skeptical
and diverse viewpoints on courts, and the viability of court-led regulation of
law enforcement actors.

INTRODUCTION
When Maryland’s State Attorney, Marilyn Mosby declared that she
had filed criminal charges against the six Baltimore police officers she believed were responsible for the death of Freddie Gray, a bitter and often
rancorous public debate immediately commenced over the propriety of her
© 2018, David Jaros. All rights reserved.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. Thanks are due for
insightful comments and conversations with Josh Bowers, Doug Colbert, Brandon Garrett, Rachel
Harmon, Carissa Hessick, Will Hubbard, Lee Kovarsky, Colin Starger and all the attendees of The
Criminal Justice Roundtable at the University of Virginia School of Law. Adam Zimmerman was
decidedly unhelpful, and all the errors are his.
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actions, the guilt of the officers, and the manner in which poor minority
communities were being policed across the United States. 1 Yet, despite
widespread division over nearly every aspect of these cases, advocates on
both sides were united in one critical respect: each expressed their lack of
confidence in the capacity of the criminal justice system to fairly and accurately resolve the cases. 2
The shared distrust of the legal system to mete out justice raised important questions about the legitimacy and the integrity of important political institutions. 3 But there was also a notable irony in the Freddie Gray cases. Although participants on both sides expressed a lack of faith in the system’s ability to resolve the cases fairly, the legal issues and the ultimate outcome of the cases were shaped by criminal doctrines that were predicated
on the Supreme Court’s faith in that same system and its actors.
Some constitutional doctrines are premised on a historical understanding of a particular constitutional provision. 4 Others are shaped by the text
itself. 5 Scholars have debated the import of a comma and its impact on the
scope of the federal courts’ jurisdiction. 6 Debates over the meaning of the
Second Amendment have focused on the framers’ interest in militias and
their concern (or lack thereof) in individuals’ personal right to own firearms. 7 What was striking about the trials of the officers charged in the death
1
See, e.g., Charlotte Alter, Baltimore Cops to Face Charges in Freddie Gray Case, TIME
(May 1, 2015), http://time.com/3843342/freddie-gray-charges-police-baltimore/ [https://perma.cc/
4R33-45FL] (describing community responses both supporting and condemning the decision to
charge the officers); Editorial, The Lessons of Baltimore, and Ferguson, and Too Many Places, L.A.
TIMES (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-baltimore-20150429story.html [https://perma.cc/S4Z5-GZ74]. Freddie Gray was a young African-American Baltimore
man who was fatally injured while shackled in the back of a police van. See infra notes 21–39 and
accompanying text.
2
See Lauryn P. Gouldin, Redefining Reasonable Seizures, 93 DENV. L. REV. 53, 55–56
(2015) (describing protests born out of the death of Freddie Gray and several other highly publicized deaths of black men that highlighted skepticism in heavily policed communities that the
judiciary would reign in the reach of the police); Alter, supra note 1 (including statements by the
lawyer for the Baltimore police union, who expressed skepticism about the fairness of the charges
against the officers).
3
See Gouldin, supra note 2, at 56 (discussing the impact of the protests).
4
R. Randall Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation and the Four Main Approaches to
Constitutional Interpretation in American Legal History, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 121, 128 (1994).
5
Id.
6
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers
of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 217 n.50 (1985) (“[T]he comma after ‘fact’ clearly
implies that the ‘exceptions’ power applies to appellate jurisdiction generally and not simply to
facts.”).
7
Kenneth Lasson, Blunderbuss Scholarship: Perverting the Original Intent and Plain Meaning of the Second Amendment, 32 U. BALT. L. REV. 127, 130 (2003) (“From a strictly historical
perspective, however, the overwhelming weight of available evidence demonstrates that the pri-
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of Freddie Gray was the number of legal issues that were resolved by doctrines, based not on history or text, but rather on the Supreme Court’s presumption that police and prosecutors are to be trusted.
While decisions like Mapp v. Ohio and Miranda v. Arizona popularized a conception of the Supreme Court as a protector of criminal defendants and a bulwark against overly aggressive law enforcement, 8 scholars
have long criticized the Court for its tendency to side with the government
in criminal procedure cases. 9 Such scholars have noted the Court’s reluctance to impede effective criminal investigations, the justices’ penchant for
asserting dubious factual claims about the nature of policing, and their willingness to defer to police “expertise.” 10 The Court has been equally solicitous of prosecutors. Prosecutors, it has found, must be afforded absolute
immunity so that they can act with “courage and independence.” 11 The
Court has presumed repeatedly that “the government attorney in a criminal
prosecution is not an ordinary party to a controversy, but a servant of the
mary concern of the Founding Fathers was the concept of a militia—as distinguished from a
standing federal army—not the right of each individual citizen to own firearms.”).
8
See Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 765 (2012) (“But
whatever else the Court can be said to have done, it allocated wholesale the responsibility for
solving the problem of policing to courts and promoted the regulation of the police primarily by
constitutional adjudication.”); William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice,
119 HARV. L. REV. 781, 791–92 (2006) (“When the Supreme Court constitutionalized criminal
procedure in the 1960s the conventional wisdom, evidently shared by the Justices, held that elected legislators would never adequately protect the interests of criminal suspects and defendants.”).
See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (creating a prophylactic rule to protect the
Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(extending from federal to state courts the exclusionary rule as a remedy for a Fourth Amendment
violation).
9
See, e.g., John Michael Harlow, California v. Acevedo: The Ominous March of a Loyal
Foot Soldier, 52 LA. L. REV. 1205, 1263 (1992) (describing the Court’s increasing deference to
law enforcement); Elizabeth E. Joh, Discretionless Policing: Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 199, 200–01 (2007) (“Ever since the Warren Court’s revolution in criminal procedure, numerous decisions have imposed constitutional constraints on the police, yet none
of them curb police discretion to any meaningful degree.” (footnote omitted)); David A. Sklansky,
Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV.
271, 273 (arguing that, between 1996 and 1997, the Supreme Court’s decisions in four cases related to vehicle stops “strongly favor law enforcement”).
10
See Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise, 130 HARV. L. REV.
1995, 1997–98 (2017) (noting the Court’s command for deference to law enforcement); Sklansky,
supra note 9, at 324 (“The judiciary, moreover, has shied away from detailed regulation of police
officers’ use of force, partly because it fears hampering law enforcement . . . .”); Seth W. Stoughton, Policing Facts, 88 TUL. L. REV. 847, 848–49, 851 (2014) (arguing that the Court has based a
number of criminal procedure decisions on inaccurate assumptions about policing).
11
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422–23 (1976) (quoting Pearson v. Reed, 44 P.2d 592,
597 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1935)); see Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949) (“In this
instance it has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest
officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation.”).
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law.” 12 In Singer v. United States, the Court held that prosecutors need not
articulate their reasons for refusing to allow a defendant to waive a jury,
proclaiming its “confidence in the integrity of the federal prosecutor” when
it rejected the idea that “prosecutors would demand a jury trial for an ignoble purpose.” 13
Yet, perhaps because the Court’s rulings at times vindicate defendants’
rights and restrict prosecutorial and police activity 14 and at other times grant
criminal justice actors broad license to act, 15 the Court’s failure to assess
accurately either the nature of the government’s actions or the ramifications
of its rulings is generally regarded as a discrete failure in appreciating the
specifics of the case rather than a bias that favors one side over the other. 16
A closer analysis of the Court’s decisions, however, reveals that criminal constitutional procedure is fashioned with a deep and abiding faith in
the motivations of criminal justice system actors. 17 Even those decisions
that vindicate individual constitutional rights at the expense of police and
prosecutorial power are shaped by the Court’s fundamental belief that police and prosecutors can be trusted. This Article suggests that the Court’s
abiding faith in the criminal justice system in the face of the deep distrust
exhibited by both supporters and detractors of the prosecution of the officers charged in the death of Freddie Gray is not merely ironic. On the contrary, the Court’s holdings that are premised on its faith in the criminal justice
system raise profound questions about the strength of those precedents, the
importance of diverse viewpoints on the Court, and the viability of court-led
regulation of police and prosecutors.
Part I of this Article explores several key Supreme Court decisions that
played pivotal roles in the cases against the officers charged in the death of
Freddie Gray and identifies how those decisions are founded, either explicitly or implicitly, on trusting the motivations and actions of police and pros12
Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 37 (1965) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Berger
v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
13
Id. at 37.
14
See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (forbidding the prosecution to withhold favorable evidence from the defendant); Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655 (prohibiting the use in state
courts of evidence obtained by the police in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
15
See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (holding that traffic stops are
valid regardless of the subjective motivations of the investigating officers, so long as the officers
have probable cause to make the stop); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 987 (1984) (adopting
the “good faith exception” to the exclusionary rule).
16
See, e.g., Stoughton, supra note 10, at 852 (discussing how the Court’s reliance on inaccurate facts also leads to faulty rulings).
17
Although this Article speaks of the Court’s “faith” in police and prosecutors, this terminology is not to suggest that all nine Justices share identical views or that no case exists in which the
majority decision adopted a skeptical view of how police and prosecutors behave.
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ecutors. 18 Part II delves deeper into the Supreme Court’s criminal procedure
jurisprudence and identifies three potential sources of faith for the doctrines
established by those cases: faith in police and prosecutors’ character, faith in
the institutions in which they work, and faith in the courts’ ability to identify and deter misconduct. 19 Part III considers three questions: (1) whether
“Criminal Doctrines of Faith” are particularly vulnerable to narrowing by
lower courts; (2) what these cases suggest about the value of diverse viewpoints on the federal bench; and, (3) what the courts’ reliance on the good
intentions of police and prosecutors means for the viability of court-led regulation of police and prosecutors. 20
I. CRIMINAL DOCTRINES OF FAITH AND THE FREDDIE GRAY TRIALS
A. The Death of Freddie Gray
When twenty-five-year-old Freddie Gray saw Lieutenant Brian Rice at
8:39 a.m. on a bright spring April morning, he made a fatal error—he ran. 21
Had Mr. Gray lived in nearby Roland Park, an affluent neighborhood a few
miles north, Officer Rice would have lacked the authority to order his fellow bike officers, Edward Nero and Garrett Miller, to pursue and seize Mr.
Gray. 22 Unfortunately, the Sandtown-Winchester neighborhood of NorthWest Baltimore where Freddie Gray grew up suffered from one of the highest crime rates in the city. 23 As a result, Mr. Gray’s decision to avoid police
contact was not an exercise of his right to “ignore the police presence and

18

See infra notes 21–148 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 149–211 and accompanying text.
20
See infra notes 212–282 and accompanying text.
21
See Kevin Rector, The 45-minute Mystery of Freddie Gray’s Death, BALT. SUN (Apr. 25,
2015), http://data.baltimoresun.com/freddie-gray/ [https://perma.cc/5EJP-BPXE] (describing Freddie
Gray’s encounter with police on April 12, 2015).
22
See id. (explaining the officers’ justifications for pursuing Mr. Gray included that “he ran . . .
in an area known for drug dealing[]”); see also Christopher Corbett, Baltimore’s Truth in Freddie
Gray’s Death, REUTERS: THE GREAT DEBATE (Apr. 28. 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/greatdebate/2015/04/28/the-baltimore-truth-in-freddie-grays-life-and-death/
[https://perma.cc/A9NB98UF] (describing the dichotomy between Roland Park in North Baltimore and West Baltimore
where Mr. Gray lived).
23
See Adam Marton & Emma Patti Harris, Graphic: Sandtown-Winchester Neighborhood
Ranks Well Below City Average in Most Health Factors, BALT. SUN (Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.
baltimoresun.com/news/data/bal-sandtownwinchester-neighborhood-health-well-below-city-averagein-most-factors-20150430-htmlstory.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20180908011350/http://
www.baltimoresun.com/news/data/bal-sandtownwinchester-neighborhood-health-well-below-cityaverage-in-most-factors-20150430-htmlstory.html] (ranking Baltimore neighborhoods based on
criteria such as the rate of non-fatal shootings and homicides).
19
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go about his business.” 24 Instead, it gave the police the license they needed
to chase him down, forcibly subdue him, and search him for weapons. 25
When their search uncovered a knife that allegedly violated a city ordinance, the officers were legally authorized to place Mr. Gray under arrest. 26
Although questions remain to this day as to how and when Mr. Gray
ultimately received his fatal injury, the immediate aftermath of Mr. Gray’s
arrest was caught on camera. 27 After being forcibly subdued and held face
down on the pavement with his legs bent backwards in a “leg lace” hold,
Mr. Gray complained loudly and his screams of pain brought out the residents of the Gilmor Homes public housing complex where Mr. Gray had
grown up. 28 One of those residents, Kevin Moore, filmed Mr. Gray being
dragged screaming to a Baltimore Police Transport Wagon with his hands

24
See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000) (citation omitted) (“[W]hen an officer,
without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, approaches an individual, the individual has a
right to ignore the police and go about his business.” (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498
(1983))).
25
See id. at 124 (concluding that “unprovoked flight” in a “high crime area” constitutes “reasonable suspicion” justifying a suspect’s temporary detention).
26
See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 421, 424 (1976) (upholding the validity of a
warrantless arrest based upon probable cause); Justin Fenton, Video Shows Officer Operating the
Knife Recovered from Freddie Gray, BALT. SUN (Oct. 31, 2016), http://www.baltimoresun.com/
news/maryland/investigations/bs-md-ci-freddie-gray-knife-video-20161028-story.html
[https://
web.archive.org/web/20171108032736/http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/investigatio
ns/bs-md-ci-freddie-gray-knife-video-20161028-story.html] (describing the knife Mr. Gray was
carrying as possibly illegal under a decades-old ordinance). But see William A. Schroeder, Warrantless Misdemeanor Arrests and the Fourth Amendment, 58 MO. L. REV. 771, 826–27, 828
n.233 (1993) (observing that, although most states allow police to make warrantless arrests on
probable cause for misdemeanors committed in the arresting officer’s presence, the Supreme
Court has never explicitly endorsed the practice).
27
See generally Rector, supra note 21 (indicating points in time when Mr. Gray’s condition
was unknown).
28
Colin Campbell, Man Critically Injured in Videotaped Baltimore Police Encounter, BALT.
SUN (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/bs-md-ci-gilmor-homesarrest-20150413-story.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20180712015352/http://www.baltimore
sun.com/news/maryland/crime/bs-md-ci-gilmor-homes-arrest-20150413-story.html]; Karl Merton
Ferron, Investigating the Freddie Gray Case, BALT. SUN, http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/
maryland/baltimore-city/bal-behind-the-scenes-baltimore-police-investi-002-photo.html [https://
perma.cc/JN9D-V653]; Justin George, Exclusive Look Inside the Freddie Gray Investigation,
BALT. SUN (May 2, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/sun-investigates/bs-mdci-freddie-gray-investigation-20150502-story.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20180712014601/
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/sun-investigates/bs-md-ci-freddie-gray-investigation20150502-story.html]; Eyder Peralta, Timeline: What We Know About the Freddie Gray Arrest,
NPR: THE TWO-WAY (May 1, 2015), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/05/01/4036
29104/baltimore-protests-what-we-know-about-the-freddie-gray-arrest [https://perma.cc/9GNMXTRQ]; Rector, supra note 21.
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cuffed behind his back. 29 After the rear doors were closed by the driver, Officer Caesar Goodson, the van swayed back and forth as Mr. Gray continued
to protest his detention from the inside of the vehicle. 30
At trial, the prosecution would contest the defendants’ claim that they
were forced to make a hurried exit from Gilmor Homes in the face of an
increasingly hostile crowd. 31 Regardless of the reason, the van driver was
ordered to leave the area for Central Booking. 32 Moments later, however,
Lieutenant Rice ordered Officer Goodson to pull over so that officers could
meet the van and place Mr. Gray in additional constraints. 33 As a result, Mr.
Gray was subsequently removed from the van and placed in leg shackles. 34
The officers later testified that the uncooperative Mr. Gray was then carried
back inside the van and placed face down on the metal floor with his ankles
shackled together and his arms handcuffed behind his back. 35
Exactly what happened next remains a mystery to this day. Approximately forty minutes after Mr. Gray was initially loaded into the police van,
he arrived at the Western District police station “unresponsive” and in “serious medical distress,” having sustained a spinal injury in the course of his
ride that proved to be fatal a week later. 36 The graphic video of Mr. Gray’s
arrest and his subsequent death sparked widespread civil protests and riot-

29

Kevin Richardson, Man Who Shot Freddie Gray Arrest Video, ‘I Finally Made a Difference,’
BALT. SUN (May 1, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/videos/83439379-132.html [https://web.
archive.org/web/20180712022211/http://www.baltimoresun.com/videos/83439379-132.html].
30
See Juliet Linderman, In Trial Over Prisoner’s Death, Seat Belt Policy Is Examined,
WASH. TIMES (May 17, 2016), https://go.shr.lc/2NImNhS [https://perma.cc/X5GL-UENL] (describing testimony that the van was shaking back and forth).
31
Donna Owens, Baltimore Police Lieutenant Acquitted in Freddie Gray Case, REUTERS
(July 18, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-baltimore-police/baltimore-police-lieutenantacquitted-in-freddie-gray-case-idUSKCN0ZY0YP [https://perma.cc/4P9T-QUX9].
32
Adam Marton & Emma Patti Harris, Freddie Gray Arrest Timeline, BALT. SUN (Apr. 21,
2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bal-map-freddie-gray-arresttimeline-20150421-htmlstory.html
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180712015856/http://www.
baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bal-map-freddie-gray-arrest-timeline-20150421htmlstory.html]; Timeline: Freddie Gray’s Arrest, Death and the Aftermath, BALT. SUN, http://
data.baltimoresun.com/news/freddie-gray/ [https://perma.cc/VA7L-AUM9].
33
Marton & Harris, supra note 32; Timeline: Freddie Gray’s Arrest, Death and the Aftermath, supra note 32.
34
Rector, supra note 21; Timeline: Freddie Gray’s Arrest, Death and the Aftermath, supra
note 32.
35
Peralta, supra note 28.
36
Meredith Cohn, Medical Professionals Will Try to Determine How Gray’s Neck Was Injured,
BALT. SUN (Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/health/bs-hs-freddie-gray-medical20150427-story.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20180712020909/http://www.baltimoresun.com/
health/bs-hs-freddie-gray-medical-20150427-story.html].
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ing in the streets of Baltimore, prompting the Governor to order the National Guard to secure the city. 37
Anger over Mr. Gray’s death was fueled, in part, by widespread stories
that Baltimore police officers punished difficult arrestees by giving them
“rough rides,” a practice in which officers deliberately drive erratically so
as to throw unsecured detainees around the van and cause them injury. 38 It
was in this context that the Baltimore State’s Attorney, Marilyn Mosby, took
to the steps of the Baltimore War Memorial across from City Hall and publically announced that her office was pursuing criminal charges against six
of the officers who had been involved in the arrest, transport, and death of
Mr. Gray. 39
B. Trials and Errors: Three Instances of Criminal Doctrines of Faith
The trials of the officers charged in Freddie Gray’s death received substantial public attention and contributed to a nationwide debate over police
involved deaths, racial justice, and the policing of poor minority communities. 40 Yet, rather than resolve what happened to Freddie Gray and restore
faith in the criminal justice system, the trials served to further polarize public opinion and raise doubts about the actions of not only the defendant police officers, but also the officers who investigated the cases and the prosecutors who brought the charges. 41 When the prosecution finally dismissed
the remaining cases without securing a single conviction, the Baltimore
State’s Attorney, Marilyn Mosby, excoriated the police and declared that
department investigators had sabotaged the State’s case in a successful effort to protect their own. 42 Across town, police union officials and the offic-

37
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Baltimore Enlists National Guard and a Curfew to Fight Riots and
Looting, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2m88WqB [https://perma.cc/FK67-FNGZ].
38
Doug Donovan, Proving ‘Rough Ride’ in Court Is Difficult, Police and Legal Experts Say,
BALT. SUN (June 23, 2016), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-mdrough-rides-20160623-story.html
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180712021455/http://www.
baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-rough-rides-20160623-story.html].
39
George, supra note 28.
40
See, e.g., Haeyoun Park & Jasmine C. Lee, Looking for Accountability in Police-Involved
Deaths of Blacks, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2jS8ESr [https://perma.cc/A7FHCWRL] (describing the nationwide protests and policy debates ignited by high profile police involved deaths).
41
Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Jess Bidgood, All Charges Dropped Against Baltimore Officers in
Freddie Gray Case, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/28/us/chargesdropped-against-3-remaining-officers-in-freddie-gray-case.html [https://perma.cc/RTF5-MQMU].
42
Transcript: State’s Attorney Marilyn Mosby on the Dropped Charges, BALT. SUN (July 27,
2016), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bal-transcript-state-s-attorneymarilyn-mosby-on-the-dropped-charges-20160727-story.html [https://web.archive.org/web/2018
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ers’ attorneys publically maintained that the acquittals vindicated their claims
that the charges against the officers had been politically motivated and that
the State’s Attorney had deliberately ignored exculpatory evidence. 43
The deep distrust and hostility between the police and the city’s chief
prosecutor appeared to reflect national divisions over police misconduct and
racial justice. 44 But three key moments in the trials involved Criminal Doctrines of Faith—doctrines which presumed that both the police and prosecutors could be trusted.
1. Illinois v. Wardlow and the Alleged Assault of Freddie Gray by Bike
Patrol Officers
Freddie Gray’s decision to run when he saw Lieutenant Brian Rice not
only led directly to his death, it also critically undermined the State’s case
against the officers involved in his detention and arrest. 45 A police officer
cannot detain an individual, even temporarily, if the officer lacks a reasonably articulable suspicion that “criminal activity may be afoot.” 46 Moreover,
the courts have recognized that individuals have a right to refuse to speak to
the police and officers cannot stop a person who deliberately avoids police

0713024435/http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bal-transcript-state-sattorney-marilyn-mosby-on-the-dropped-charges-20160727-story.html].
43
See Alter, supra note 1 (presenting the police union’s initial condemnation of the charges as
beyond the boundaries of the law); Stolberg & Bidgood, supra note 41 (alluding to the political
ramifications of the trials); Pamela Wood & Wyatt Massey, Baltimore FOP President: ‘Justice
Has Been Done’ in Dropping Charges Against Police Officers, BALT. SUN (July 27, 2016), http://
www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-charges-dropped-fop-201 [https://web.
archive.org/web/20171114125703/http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bsmd-charges-dropped-fop-20160727-story.html] (offering the defense’s response to the dropped
charges).
44
See, e.g., Scott Dance, Donald Trump: Marilyn Mosby ‘Should Prosecute Herself,’ BALT.
SUN (July 27, 2016), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bal-donald-trumpmarilyn-mosby-should-prosecute-herself-20160727-story.html [https://web.archive.org/web/2017
1114125703/http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bal-donald-trump-marilynmosby-should-prosecute-herself-20160727-story.html] (condemning the prosecutor while celebrating the police officers); Nicole Hemmer, Opinion, The Brutality President, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/thomas-jefferson-street/articles/
2017-08-29/donald-trump-is-the-police-brutality-president [https://web.archive.org/web/20180714
030918/https://www.usnews.com/opinion/thomas-jefferson-street/articles/2017-08-29/donald-trumpis-the-police-brutality-president] (describing President Trump’s implicit endorsement of racial
profiling and his explicit support for the rough treatment of suspects).
45
See, e.g., Transcript: State’s Attorney Marilyn Mosby on the Dropped Charges, supra note
42 (linking Mr. Gray’s decision to run to his death).
46
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (outlining the criteria required for detention).
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contact. 47 Yet while Freddie Gray may have had the right to “walk away”
from Lieutenant Rice, he did not have the right to run. 48
In 2000, in Illinois v. Wardlow, Chief Justice William Rehnquist distinguished the mere refusal to interact with the police from “unprovoked
flight,” explaining that “unprovoked flight” in a “high crime area” could
constitute reasonable suspicion sufficient to support the officer’s right to
forcibly detain a suspect. 49 Although the Wardlow decision has been roundly criticized for creating disparities between the way that poor communities
of color and wealthier (typically whiter) communities are policed, Freddie
Gray’s decision to run from Lieutenant Rice provided the officers with the
legal justification they needed to pursue and detain him. 50 This legal authority would subsequently prove to be a crucial obstacle in the State’s effort to
convict the three arresting officers of assault. 51
When State’s Attorney Marilyn Mosby initially announced that she
was filing charges, the three bike officers involved in Mr. Gray’s arrest were
accused of committing intentional and negligent assault, false imprisonment, and misconduct in office. 52 Although the “spring assisted knife” that
47
Royer, 460 U.S. at 497–98 (“The person approached [by the police] . . . need not answer
any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his
way.” (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 32–33 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 34 (White, J., concurring)));
see also United States v. Sprinkle, 106 F.3d 613, 618 (4th Cir. 1997) (affirming that officers
lacked “reasonable, articulable suspicion” to stop an individual who sought to hide his face and
drive away from police at normal speed).
48
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 32–33 (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining that “ordinarily the person
addressed has an equal right to ignore his interrogator and walk away”).
49
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124.
50
See id. (finding that defendant’s “unprovoked flight” from officers in area of heavy narcotics trafficking supported reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in criminal activity and
justified his temporary detention); Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing: Evaluating Stop and Frisk as a Modality of Urban Policing, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2397, 2448 (2017)
(“Indeed, even setting aside the question of how a ‘high crime area’ is to be identified or bounded,
Wardlow explicitly subsidizes police activity in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty in comparison to wealthy neighborhoods.”); Adam B. Wolf, The Adversity of Race and Place: Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence in Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 S. Ct. 673 (2000), 5 MICH. J. RACE & L.
711, 715 (2000) (arguing that Wardlow recognizes substantially fewer Fourth Amendment protections for people of color and indigent citizens than for the wealthy and white); Owens, supra note
31 (noting that Mr. Gray “fled unprovoked in a high-crime area” and it was this flight that resulted
in the officers chasing him).
51
See Transcript: State’s Attorney Marilyn Mosby on the Dropped Charges, supra note 42
(explaining the chief prosecutor’s decision to drop the remaining charges in light of not guilty
verdicts already handed down for other defendants).
52
See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-203 (West 2018) (defining statutorily intentional and
negligent assault); Duncan v. State, 384 A.2d 456, 458 (Md. 1978) (describing the common law
crime of misconduct); Midgett v. State, 139 A.2d 209, 216 (Md. 1958) (describing the elements of
the common law charge of false imprisonment); Lori Aratani, Paul Duggan & Dan Morse, Six
Officers Charged in Death of Freddie Gray, WASH. POST (May 1, 2015), https://www.washington
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the police recovered from Mr. Gray may have been legal under state law,
unfortunately for the prosecution, the defense was able to point to a city
ordinance that appeared to ban such weapons. 53 As a result, the State’s Attorney was unable to claim that the police lacked probable cause to hold Mr.
Gray once the knife was discovered. 54 Moreover, despite the graphic video
of Mr. Gray being dragged screaming to the police van, no additional evidence materialized that suggested that the officers had physically assaulted
Mr. Gray. 55 In fact, the autopsy suggested that the only significant injury
Mr. Gray received was the blow to the head that effectively severed his
spine, which both the defense and the prosecution agreed occurred after Mr.
Gray had been loaded into the van and driven away. 56
As a result, the prosecution was forced to abandon the false imprisonment charge and pursue an assault charge premised not on a deliberate beating, but on the theory that the officers lacked the authority to touch Mr.
Gray before the knife was recovered. 57 Under this theory, any contact the
officers made with Mr. Gray would constitute an “offensive touching,”
thereby satisfying the battery element for second degree felony assault. 58

post.com/local/overnight-calm-in-baltimore-as-tensions-remain-and-protests-expected/2015/05/
01/00e07e7a-efe6-11e4-8666-a1d756d0218e_story.html?utm_term= .7344d5a0f75b [https://perma.
cc/Y9XQ-YN5X] (outlining the initial charges).
53
Fenton, supra note 26. Although the prosecution abandoned its claim that the knife was
legal, the question as to whether the ordinance did in fact apply to Mr. Gray’s knife was never
fully resolved. See id. (explaining the discussion surrounding Mr. Gray’s knife and the ordinance).
54
See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) (“On reason and authority the true
rule is that if the search and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable cause . . . the
search and seizure are valid.”); Fenton, supra note 26 (discussing the legality of Mr. Gray’s arrest).
55
See Rector, supra note 21 (detailing the lack of concrete evidence of a substantial physical
altercation).
56
Justin Fenton, Autopsy of Freddie Gray Shows ‘High-Energy’ Impact, BALT. SUN (June 24,
2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-freddie-gray-autopsy20150623-story.html
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180901110206/http://www.baltimoresun.
com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-freddie-gray-autopsy-20150623-story.html].
57
See Fenton, supra note 26 (discussing the prosecution’s theory that Mr. “Gray was illegally
detained before the knife was found”); Peter Hermann & Paul Duggan, Six Baltimore Police Officers Indicted in Death of Freddie Gray, WASH. POST (May 21, 2015), https://www.washington
post.com/local/crime/six-baltimore-police-officers-indicted-in-death-of-freddie-gray/2015/05/21/
182f2778-fe1b-11e4-805c-c3f407e5a9e9_story.html?utm_term=.302b7a76c60e
[https://perma.
cc/N67M-92KM] (contrasting the indictments to the initial charges). The officers were not indicted on the false imprisonment charges, though it remains unclear whether the grand jury refused to
indict or whether the State chose not to pursue those charges after reviewing the available evidence. Hermann & Duggan, supra.
58
See Claggett v. State, 670 A.2d 1002, 1009 (Md. 1996) (“Battery is commonly defined as a
harmful, unlawful, or offensive touching. Moreover, the unlawful application of force to another,
however slight, constitutes a battery.” (citations omitted)).
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The flaw in the prosecution’s argument was that there was little doubt
under Wardlow that the officers had the right to pursue and detain Mr.
Gray. 59 There was no question that the area of West Baltimore where Mr.
Gray was arrested was a “high crime area.” 60 In fact, just three weeks prior
to Mr. Gray’s fatal encounter with the officers, the State’s Attorney had requested that the police target the neighborhood with “enhanced” drug enforcement efforts. 61 At the close of trial, the prosecution was forced to concede that the police were authorized under Wardlow to pursue and briefly
detain Mr. Gray when he fled from Lieutenant Rice. 62 As a result, the prosecution was compelled to argue that Mr. Gray’s lawful detention “morphed”
into an arrest without probable cause in the three and a half minutes between his initial seizure and the discovery of the knife. 63 In support of this
argument, the prosecution argued that, by waiting for Lieutenant Rice to
arrive on the scene rather than radioing for additional information, Officers
Nero and Miller were not sufficiently diligent in dispelling their “reasonable
suspicion.” 64
In her closing argument, Assistant State’s Attorney Janice Bledsoe argued that African-American men in Baltimore are routinely “jacked up” by
the police and that officers habitually seize suspects without probable cause
and “throw them up against the wall.” 65 Relying on Wardlow, the defense,
59
See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (allowing law enforcement to stop an individual who runs
away unprovoked in a “high crime area”).
60
See Marton & Harris, supra note 23 (comparing certain crime statistics for SandtownWinchester to the Baltimore city average).
61
Kevin Rector, Baltimore Prosecutor Asked Police to Target Area Where Freddie Gray Was
Arrested, BALT. SUN (June 9, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/bs-mdci-mosby-email-20150609-story.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20180808011915/http://www.
baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/bs-md-ci-mosby-email-20150609-story.html].
62
Transcript of the Verdict Hearing for Officer Edward M. Nero, WASH. POST (May 23, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/transcript-of-the-verdict-hearing-for-officer-edward-mnero/2016/05/23/9ce6e780-2124-11e6-8690-f14ca9de2972_story.html?utm_term=.1e13f8a121e7
[https://perma.cc/X22G-ML66].
63
See Fenton, supra note 26 (discussing the allegedly illegal arrest); David A. Graham, Can
Prosecutors Convict Anyone at All in the Death of Freddie Gray?, THE ATLANTIC (June 6, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/freddie-gray-caesar-goodson-trial/485792/
[https://perma.cc/ENC3-CPAH] (describing the prosecution’s theory).
64
See Graham, supra note 63 (elaborating on the prosecution’s interpretation and application of
Wardlow). Lieutenant Rice was pursuing a second suspect who had been with Mr. Gray and so Officers Nero and Miller made the arrest. Timeline: Freddie Gray’s Arrest to His Fatal Spinal Cord
Injury, CBS BALT. (June 23, 2106), https://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2016/06/23/timeline-freddiegrays-arrest-to-his-fatal-spinal-cord-injury/ [https://perma.cc/X5YJ-58EL].
65
Kevin Rector & Justin Fenton, Prosecutors, Defense Disagree in Closings on What Constitutes an Assault at Officer Edward Nero’s Trial, BALT. SUN (May 19, 2016), http://www.baltimore
sun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-nero-closing-20160519-story.html [https://web.archive.
org/web/20171116223642/http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-nero-
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focusing on the specifics of the Gray case, responded that “[b]eing detained
is a horrible thing, but the law allows this,” and Baltimore Circuit Judge
Barry G. Williams called the practice “a separate issue.” 66
Ultimately, Judge Williams acquitted Officer Nero, finding that the
State failed to prove that Nero touched Mr. Gray during the critical interval
between Gray’s seizure and the discovery of his knife. 67 Effectively hamstrung by the Wardlow decision, the prosecution was unable to demonstrate
that the police officers’ decision to chase, tackle, and search Mr. Gray violated the law.
A closer analysis of Wardlow, however, reveals that the prosecution’s
observations about police practices were not “a separate issue” but rather
struck at the foundation of the decision—the Supreme Court’s faith in the
police. In essence, Wardlow didn’t validate the actions of the police in the
Freddie Gray cases. Rather, the actions of the police in the Freddie Gray
cases cast doubt on the legitimacy of the Wardlow decision.
In Wardlow, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that “[h]eadlong flight
. . . is the consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of
wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.” 68 Casually embedded in
this pronouncement, however, is the presumption that a young AfricanAmerican man in a high crime area would not flee the presence of a law
enforcement officer absent a substantial likelihood that he was engaged in
criminal activity. Yet if the prosecution’s claim were true—that police officers regularly jack up young black men without reasonable suspicion, much
less probable cause—then Chief Justice Rehnquist’s empirical claim becomes suspect.
The fundamental premise of Wardlow is that running from the police is
indicative of criminal activity. 69 If individuals run out of fear of police harassment, then the claim that flight in a high crime area supports a finding of
reasonable suspicion is substantially weaker. In fact, given the likelihood
that police misconduct occurs at a greater rate in heavily policed high crime
closing-20160519-story.html]; see Graham, supra note 63 (offering additional claims of brutality
made by the State’s Attorney).
66
See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124; Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 (allowing the police to stop a person
for investigatory purposes); P. Kenneth Burns, Nero Trial Is Now in Judge’s Hands, WYPR (May
19, 2016), http://news.wypr.org/post/nero-trial-now-judge-s-hands#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/
2326-YB7E] (providing judge’s response to prosecution’s closing arguments in Officer Nero’s
trial); Mike Hellgren, Judge in Freddie Gray-Officer Trial Grills Prosecutors, CBS BALT. (May
19, 2016), http://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2016/05/19/edward-nero-trial-closing-arguments [https://
perma.cc/2UTA-96J3] (recapping the closing arguments).
67
Transcript of the Verdict Hearing for Officer Edward M. Nero, supra note 62.
68
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124.
69
Id.
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areas, it may be that flight from the police in such places is less likely to
justify a seizure than running in more affluent areas of town where such
harassment is less frequent. 70
In a report on policing in Baltimore produced by the Department of
Justice (DOJ) in the wake of Freddie Gray’s death, the DOJ found that Baltimore Police Department (BPD) officers “routinely” detained and questioned individuals who were “sitting, standing, or walking in public areas,
even where officers ha[d] no basis to suspect them of wrongdoing.” 71 Only
3.7% of the 7200 BPD stops reviewed by the DOJ resulted in either an arrest or even the issuance of a citation. 72 Moreover, the DOJ found that Baltimore citizens were at times detained and transported to booking facilities
simply for not having adequate identification on their person, a practice that
the DOJ noted was unconstitutional even in instances in which the officers
had reasonable suspicion. 73 When one patrol officer protested that he had
no valid reason to stop and disperse a group of young African-American
males on a street corner, his sergeant, in the presence of the DOJ observer,
responded, “[t]hen make something up.” 74
Unjustified detentions were not the only concern outlined in the DOJ
report that might shake one’s faith in the presumptions undergirding Wardlow. The report also included instances in which suspects had been subjected to humiliating (and unlawful) public strip searches; unjustified arrests for
non-criminal activities, such as standing on a public street that bordered
public property; and overly aggressive police tactics that escalated to physical assault and other forms of “unreasonable uses of force.” 75 The documented use of these tactics is not to suggest that all officers or even the vast
majority of officers were regularly breaking the law. If these practices were
sufficiently widespread to shape the public’s perception of the police, however, then they would explain why a young man like Freddie Gray would
70

See Erwin Chemerinsky, Law Enforcement and Criminal Law Decisions, 28 PEPP. L. REV.
517, 525 (2001) (“Imagine the next case where the flight occurs in a wealthy, white, suburban
area. In many ways, flight in those circumstances is even more suspicious than in inner cities
where there is often great distrust of police officers.”).
71
CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY
POLICE DEPARTMENT 28 (2016) https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/883296/download [https://perma.
cc/7SEY-JDDD] [hereinafter BALTIMORE DOJ REPORT].
72
Id.
73
Id. (citing United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 579–80 (5th Cir. 2008)) (noting that the
holding in Zavala was that a “90-minute detention in which the suspect was handcuffed, placed in
a police car, and transported to a different location ‘morphed from a Terry detention into a de
facto arrest’” (citation omitted)).
74
Id. at 29.
75
Id. at 33–35, 74–80, 91–96.
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run from an officer, even if criminality were not “afoot.” Indeed, the DOJ
report described as much, stating that:
Community members told [the DOJ] in interviews that even when
they believe they have done nothing wrong, they flee from interactions with officers, believing that it is better to run at the sight
of an officer rather than take the risk that an interaction with the
officer will result in unnecessary and excessive force being used
against them. 76
This critique of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s assumptions in Wardlow is
not novel. 77 Indeed, in his dissent in the same case, Justice John Paul Stevens explained that “[a]mong some citizens, particularly minorities and
those residing in high crime areas, there is also the possibility that the fleeing person is entirely innocent, but, with or without justification, believes
that contact with the police can itself be dangerous, apart from any criminal
activity associated with the officer’s sudden presence.” 78 Yet, while the anecdotal evidence encapsulated in the DOJ’s report closely mirrors Justice
Stevens’s view, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s faith in law enforcement ultimately controlled the outcome of Wardlow and became the prevailing law of the
land. As a result, even as Freddie Gray’s death sparked a nationwide conversation about law enforcement’s actions in poor minority communities,
the trials of the officers charged in his death were shaped by a doctrine
based on the assumption that individuals do not run from the police unless
they are guilty of committing a crime. 79
2. Compelling Testimony: Kastigar v. United States and the Prosecution’s
Grant of Limited Use Immunity
The first officer to stand trial was Officer William Porter. 80 Porter responded to the van driver’s request for additional support at the van’s subsequent stops. 81 The prosecution alleged that Officer Porter had ignored
76

Id. at 79.
See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 132 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that running from the police could stem from fear of the police and not guilt); BALTIMORE DOJ REPORT, supra note 71
(reflecting on how the local citizens’ fear of police results in flight).
78
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 132 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79
See id. at 124 (describing the defendant’s “unprovoked flight” as a justification for the
officers to “investigate”).
80
David Collins, Neurosurgeon: Freddie Gray Suffered Complete Spinal Cord Injury,
WBALTV (Dec. 11, 2015), http://www.wbaltv.com/article/neurosurgeon-freddie-gray-sufferedcomplete-spinal-cord-injury/7097683 [https://perma.cc/624J-7ZWL].
81
Timeline: Freddie Gray’s Arrest to His Fatal Spinal Cord Injury, supra note 65.
77
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Freddie Gray’s request to be taken to a hospital at the third stop, instead
choosing to lift the injured Mr. Gray off of the van’s floor and place him
without a seatbelt restraint on the van’s steel bench. 82 Officer Porter was
charged with involuntary manslaughter, reckless endangerment, assault, and
misconduct for failing to seek medical attention for Mr. Gray. 83 After failing
to persuade Judge Williams to shift venue out of the city, the defense elected
to try the case in front of a jury of Baltimore citizens. 84 The result after three
days of deliberation was a hung jury, and the judge declared a mistrial. 85
The mistrial left the prosecution in a quandary. Officer Goodson, the
van driver who was charged with the most serious crime, depraved heart
murder, had refused to make a statement about the events of April 12. 86 As a
result, the prosecution needed the testimony of Officer Porter to establish
some of the essential facts in their case against Goodson. 87 Porter, facing
the prospect of a second trial, indicated that he would invoke his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination if the prosecution were to call
him to testify against his fellow officer. 88 As a result, after the judge refused
to postpone the Goodson trial to allow the State to retry Porter, it appeared
that the prosecution would have to choose which police officer they would
continue to pursue. 89
82
Id. The question of when Mr. Gray received his injury and whether Officer Porter lifted Mr.
Gray himself or provided assistance as Mr. Gray maneuvered himself to the bench was hotly contested throughout the trials. See Collins, supra note 80 (discussing the possibilities of when and
how Mr. Gray received his injury in conjunction with the testimony of Officer Porter with respect
to the assistance he provided).
83
Collins, supra note 80; How Grand Jury Charges Against Officers in Freddie Gray Case
Compare to the Original Charges, BALT. SUN (May 22, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/
maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-officer-charges-list-20150522-story.html
[https://web.archive.
org/web/20180306062749/http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ciofficer-charges-list-20150522-story.html].
84
Justin Fenton & Kevin Rector, Mistrial Declared in Trial of Officer William Porter in Death
of Freddie Gray, BALT. SUN (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddiegray/bs-md-porter-trial-jury-wednesday-20151216-story.html [https://web.archive.org/web/2018
0306202034/http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-porter-trial-jurywednesday-20151216-story.html].
85
Id.; see also State v. Rice, 136 A.3d 720, 725 (Md. 2016) (summarizing the outcome of
Officer Porter’s trial in the Maryland Court of Special Appeals opinion on compelling Officer
Porter’s testimony).
86
Justin Fenton & Kevin Rector, Officer Goodson Trial: Prosecutor Says Freddie Gray ‘Was
Injured Because He Got a Rough Ride,’ BALT. SUN (June 9, 2016), http://www.baltimoresun.com/
news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-goodson-day-1-20160609-story.html [https://web.archive.
org/web/20171116124915/http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-cigoodson-day-1-20160609-story.html]; Owens, supra note 31.
87
Fenton & Rector, supra note 86.
88
Rice, 136 A.3d at 729.
89
See generally Justin Fenton & Kevin Rector, Trial of Baltimore Officer Goodson Postponed
by Maryland Appeals Court, BALT. SUN (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/
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Rather than forgo either case, the prosecution sought a court order,
pursuant to Maryland’s immunity statute, to compel Officer Porter to testify. 90 The drafted order did not grant Porter full immunity for his actions. 91
Instead, it conferred limited use immunity that barred the State from using
evidence derived from Porter’s compelled testimony but otherwise left the
State free to prosecute him at a later date. 92 In response, Porter argued that
limited use immunity was insufficient to protect his rights under both the
Fifth Amendment and Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights,
because “[t]here can be no real assurance that a prosecutor, either deliberately or accidentally, will not use information obtained through immunized
testimony.” 93 The Circuit Court and later the Maryland Court of Appeals,
however, held that the order was governed by the Supreme Court’s decision
in Kastigar v. United States. 94 In 1972, in Kastigar, the Supreme Court held
that prosecutors can compel witnesses to testify with limited use immunity
and then subsequently prosecute those witnesses so long as they demonstrate that their evidence is “derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony.” 95
Miranda v. Arizona and years of television crime dramas have led the
public to believe that the Fifth Amendment guarantees individuals “the right

maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-goodson-trial-begins-20160111-story.html
[https://web.archive.
org/web/20160127215217/http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-mdgoodson-trial-begins-20160111-story.html] (discussing the lower and appellate court decisions
about Officer Porter’s testimony in relation to the trials of the other officers).
90
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-123 (West 2018); Rice, 136 A.3d at 729. The
State’s Attorney subsequently sought to compel a second defendant, Officer Garrett Miller, to
testify in its case against Edward Nero under a similar grant of limited immunity. Kevin Rector,
Before Next Trial in Freddie Gray Case, Prosecutors Face Legal ‘Minefield’ Over Immunized
Testimony, BALT. SUN (July 25, 2016), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/
bs-md-ci-garrett-miller-freddie-gray-kastigar-hearing-20160724-story.html [https://web.archive.
org/web/20180411060522/http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-cigarrett-miller-freddie-gray-kastigar-hearing-20160724-story.html].
91
See Rice, 135 A.3d at 726 (upholding “use and derivative use immunity”).
92
Id.
93
MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. 22; Rice, 136 A.3d at 730, 745. Article 22 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights states, “That no man ought to be compelled to give evidence
against himself in a criminal case.” MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. 22. Article 22 has
been interpreted to be “in pari materia” with the Fifth Amendment. See Lupfer v. State, 21 A.3d
1080, 1091 (Md. 2011) (“We have stated repeatedly that ‘the privilege against self-incrimination
protected by Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights “generally” is “in pari materia”
with the Self–Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment.’” (quoting Marshall v. State, 999
A.2d 1029, 1035 (2010))).
94
See, e.g., Rice, 136 A.3d at 730, 746 (applying Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441
(1972) to Officer Porter’s situation).
95
Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460.
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to remain silent.” 96 In fact, the right not to be compelled to be a witness
against oneself is far more narrow than popular culture might lead one to
believe. In 1892, the Supreme Court in Counselman v. Hitchcock seemed to
suggest that nothing short of full transactional immunity would suffice to
allow the state to compel a suspect to testify. 97 In Kastigar, however, the
Court explained that Counselman had only held that statutory grants of immunity had to be “coextensive” with the scope of the Fifth Amendment
privilege, and that, rather than require full transactional immunity, the state
could compel a witness to testify so long as it was prohibited from making
any use of either the compelled testimony or its fruits. 98
The Kastigar Court stressed that it was the prosecution that bore the
“heavy burden” of proving the government’s evidence was developed independent of the compelled testimony. 99 But the use and derivative use doctrine is hardly the “comprehensive safeguard” that the majority contended it
to be. 100 Just as Wardlow evinced the Court’s faith in the police, so too did
Kastigar reveal the Court’s reliance on “the integrity and good faith of the
prosecuting authorities.” 101 Although Kastigar required that prosecutors
shoulder the burden of proving their evidence is independent, as Justice
Thurgood Marshall indicated in his dissent, stating:

96

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (“Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has
a right to remain silent . . . .”); Anderson v. Terhune, 516 F.3d 781, 783 (9th Cir. 2008) (“From
television shows like ‘Law & Order’ to movies such as ‘Guys and Dolls,’ we are steeped in the
culture that knows a person in custody has ‘the right to remain silent.’”); see Steven D. Stark,
Perry Mason Meets Sonny Crockett: The History of Lawyers and the Police as Television Heroes,
42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 229, 251 (1987) (relating the story of a suspect who told a police officer, “I
got the right to remain silent! . . . . You guys can’t trick me. I know my rights! I watch TV!”).
97
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586 (1892) (suggesting that immunity statutes
“must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offense to which the question
relates”), overruled in part by Kastigar, 406 U.S. 411 (1972); see C. Albert Bowers, Divining the
Framers’ Intentions: The Immunity Standard for Criminal Proceedings Under the Utah Constitution, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 135, 135 (describing transactional immunity prior to Kastigar v. United
States); see also Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 620 (1896) (affirming Counselman’s reasoning
that full transactional immunity was necessary to satisfy the demands of the Fifth Amendment).
98
Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453 (“Immunity from the use of compelled testimony, as well as
evidence derived directly and indirectly therefrom, affords this protection.”).
99
Id. at 461–62 (“One raising a claim under this statute need only show that he testified under
a grant of immunity in order to shift to the government the heavy burden of proving that all of the
evidence it proposes to use was derived from legitimate independent sources.”).
100
See id. at 460 (“This total prohibition on use provides a comprehensive safeguard, barring
the use of compelled testimony as an ‘investigatory lead,’ and also barring the use of any evidence
obtained by focusing investigation on a witness as a result of his compelled disclosures.” (citation
omitted)).
101
Id. at 469 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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They alone are in a position to trace the chains of information and
investigation that lead to the evidence to be used in a criminal
prosecution. A witness who suspects that his compelled testimony
was used to develop a lead will be hard pressed indeed to ferret
out the evidence necessary to prove it. 102
Given this practical reality, Justice Marshall explained, the burden of proving that evidence is independent is not difficult to meet when the defendant
cannot produce any “contrary evidence.” 103
In fact, Kastigar did more than presume that prosecutors would act
with the best of intentions—the Court also presumed that well-meaning
prosecutors would not inadvertently use evidence derived from the compelled testimony. In his dissent to a denial of certiorari in 1971, in Piccirillo
v. New York, Justice William J. Brennan decried the application of use and
derivative use immunity, not only because of the “enormous difficulty” a
defendant would face in attempting to identify whether the evidence used
against him was derived from his compelled testimony, but also because
prosecutors are fallible and they might inadvertently exchange information
or make inferences based upon compelled testimony even when they fully
intended to respect Kastigar’s prohibitions. 104
In some respects, Officer Porter’s case might have been the best case
scenario for the State to compel a defendant to testify with use and derivative use immunity. Porter’s first trial provided the defense and the court
with a full preview of the State’s evidence, leaving Porter in a relatively
good position to recognize if new evidence was offered that might have
been derived from his compelled testimony. Viewed another way, the prosecution should have had little trouble meeting their “heavy burden” under
Kastigar so long as they presented the same evidence that they had offered
in the case that resulted in a mistrial. Yet even if the State made no adjustments to their trial strategy and they presented the same case-in-chief that
they had offered in the first trial, there remained the possibility that the case
against Porter could be “tainted” by his compelled testimony. Justice Brennan’s concern that prosecutors “working in the same office” might ex102

Id.
Id.
104
Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 568 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Kastigar,
406 U.S. at 469 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[E]ven their good faith is not a sufficient safeguard.
For the paths of information through the investigative bureaucracy may well be long and winding,
and even a prosecutor acting in the best of faith cannot be certain that somewhere in the depths of
his investigative apparatus, often including hundreds of employees, there was not some prohibited
use of the compelled testimony.”).
103
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change information or make “subtle inferences” based on the actions of
their fellow attorneys presented a very real concern in the Officer Porter
case. 105 Indeed, the defense indicated that they planned to “raise questions
about the communication between the original prosecutors and the clean
team,” the new prosecution team that was ostensibly insulated within the
State’s Attorney’s office from Officer Porter’s compelled testimony. 106
Ultimately, the State never had to demonstrate whether they could
have satisfied their burden under Kastigar. On July 27, 2017, the State’s
Attorney dropped the charges against the remaining officers without having
secured a single conviction. 107 In a case that was marked by allegations of
prosecutorial misconduct, ethics violations, and assertions that the charges
were both politically motivated and defamatory, it was again striking that
the case was shaped by a constitutional doctrine that was premised on the
“integrity and good faith of the prosecuting authorities.” 108
105
See Piccirillo, 400 U.S. at 568 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (expressing skepticism about the
integrity of use and derivative use immunity).
106
Justin Fenton, Second Prosecutor in Freddie Gray Cases Leaves State’s Attorney’s Office,
BALT. SUN (Aug. 5, 2016), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-cisecond-freddie-gray-prosecutor-leaves-20160805-story.html
[https://web.archive.org/web/2016
1031064000/http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-second-freddiegray-prosecutor-leaves-20160805-story.html].
107
Kevin Rector, Charges Dropped, Freddie Gray Case Concludes with Zero Convictions
Against Officers, BALT. SUN (July 27, 2016), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddiegray/bs-md-ci-miller-pretrial-motions-20160727-story.html
[https://web.archive.org/web/2018
0813214625/http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-miller-pretrialmotions-20160727-story.html]. After the State dismissed the charges against the remaining defendants, the lead prosecutor, Michael Schatzow, admitted that he had communicated with the clean team
on multiple occasions, but he denied that those communications had either violated Kastigar or that
they had impacted the decision to drop the charges. Justin Fenton, Prosecutors in Freddie Gray Case
Maintain They Had Evidence to Convict Officers, BALT. SUN (July 28, 2016), http://www.baltimore
sun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-freddie-gray-prosecutors-speak-20160728-story.html
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180908040024/http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie
-gray/bs-md-ci-freddie-gray-prosecutors-speak-20160728-story.html].
108
See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 469 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (doubting whether prosecutors’
“good faith is . . . a sufficient safeguard”); Ryan M. McDermott, Prosecutors of Officers Accused
in Freddie Gray Death Face Pressure for Disbarment, WASH. TIMES (July 18, 2016), https://
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jul/18/john-banzhaf-law-professor-seeks-disbarment-ofbal/ [https://perma.cc/JER6-QRV5] (highlighting concerns that prosecutors brought charges based
on community pressure and “without sufficient evidence”); Eliott McLaughlin & Steve Almasy,
Freddie Gray Officers Suing Prosecutor Marilyn Mosby, CNN (July 28, 2016), http://www.cnn.
com/2016/07/27/us/baltimore-marilyn-mosby-officer-lawsuits-freddie-gray/index.html
[https://
perma.cc/4HCL-QMJ3] (describing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct); Kevin Rector, Law
Professor Calls for Disbarment of Additional Prosecutors in Freddie Gray Case, BALT. SUN (July 19,
2016), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-new-banzhaf-complaints20160719-story.html
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180908040520/http://www.baltimoresun.
com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-new-banzhaf-complaints-20160719-story.html] (explaining disbarment complaints in reaction to succession of acquittals in the cases).
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3. Failing to Disclose: Brady v. Maryland Violations in the Trials of the
Officers Charged in the Death of Freddie Gray
The trials of the officers charged in the death of Freddie Gray were the
subject of national attention and intense public scrutiny. 109 From the moment Marilyn Mosby publically announced the charges against the six police officers, every stage of the trial was covered by local and national media. 110 Given the vast amount of attention the cases received, it was all the
more surprising when, in the middle of the trial of the van driver, Officer
Cesar Goodson, the prosecution was found to have failed to meet their obligation under Brady v. Maryland to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense, not once, but on two separate occasions. 111
Donta Allen was an arrestee who had been transported in the same van
as Freddie Gray. 112 Because the transport wagons were split in half by a solid wall, Mr. Allen was unable to observe Mr. Gray, but he initially told police investigators that Gray “was banging his head against the metal like he
was trying to knock himself out.” 113 A little over two weeks after the incident, however, Mr. Allen recanted his statement, claiming that the police
were “trying to make it seem like I told them that, I made it like Freddie
Gray did that to hisself [sic].” 114 Mr. Allen’s contradicting claims compli109

trials).

110

See, e.g., Stolberg & Bidgood, supra note 41 (discussing the impact of the Freddie Gray

See, e.g., Alter, supra note 1 (providing national coverage of the charges); Rector, supra
note 108 (providing local coverage of the disbarment complaints leveled against the prosecutors).
111
See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (holding that the prosecution must provide exculpatory evidence to
the defense to comport with due process); Justin Fenton & Kevin Rector, Judge Williams to Hold
Hearing on Witness Disclosure as Officer Goodson’s Trial Opens, BALT. SUN (June 8, 2016),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-goodson-hearing-20160608story.html
[https://web.archive.org/web/20171116124911/http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/
maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-goodson-hearing-20160608-story.html] (reporting on the possibility that a potential witness interview by the prosecution provided evidence favorable to the defense); Safia Samee Ali, Trial of Van Driver in Freddie Gray Case Reveals Prosecutor Violations,
NBC NEWS (June 23, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/baltimore-unrest/trial-van-driverfreddie-gray-case-reveals-prosecutor-violations-n596731 [https://perma.cc/J9Y5-5JJD] (explaining
Judge Williams’s finding of two Brady violations).
112
Kevin Rector, Donta Allen, Man in the Van with Freddie Gray, Back in the Spotlight as
Driver’s Trial Begins, BALT. SUN (June 9, 2016), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/
freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-donta-allen-role-20160609-story.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20171
116124822/http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-donta-allen-role20160609-story.html].
113
Id.
114
Mike Schuh, The Other Man in the Van with Freddie Gray Breaks His Silence, CBS BALT.
(Apr. 30, 2015), http://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2015/04/30/wjz-exclusive-the-other-man-in-the-vanwith-freddie-gray-breaks-his-silence/ [https://perma.cc/6ZXW-CRY5]; see Diana Owens, Coroner
Said Death of Baltimore Detainee Freddie Gray an Accident-Witness, REUTERS, (June 16, 2016)
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-baltimore-police/coroner-said-death-of-baltimore-detainee-
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cated the narrative for both sides of the case, but it was the State’s failure to
turn over their notes from an undisclosed second meeting with Mr. Allen
that prompted Judge Williams to admonish the prosecution, exclaiming,
“I’m not saying you did anything nefarious. I’m saying you don’t understand what ‘exculpatory’ means.” 115
Although Judge Williams denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss on
the basis of the State’s failure to disclose their meeting with Mr. Allen, he
told the prosecution, “My concern becomes what else is out there. If your
office doesn’t get [discovery obligations], I don’t know where we are at this
point.” 116 Judge Williams’s misgivings proved prescient when, not long after rebuking the State for failing to disclose their “secret” meeting with Donta
Allen, the defense demonstrated that the State had again violated its obligations under Brady by failing to turn over the lead detective’s notes which
included statements by the medical examiner that described Mr. Gray’s
death as a “freakish accident.” 117
The State’s failure to turn over the notes of the lead detective, Dawnyell
Taylor, exposed the deep distrust that existed, not only between the defense
and the prosecution, but between the prosecution and the detectives charged
with investigating the cases. 118 In light of the State’s failure to turn over Detective Taylor’s notes, Judge Williams permitted the defense to call Taylor to
the stand. 119 In her testimony, she accused the prosecution of deliberately ignoring evidence that the officers were innocent. 120 In her subsequent crossexamination by Chief Deputy State’s Attorney Michael Schatzow, the prosecutor accused the detective of sabotaging the State’s case in an effort to protect her fellow officers. 121 Detective Taylor’s time on the stand did little to
restore the public’s faith in the process. Rather, it was striking that in a case
marked by procedural doctrines that rely on the integrity of police and prosecutors, each agency accused the other of not being trustworthy. 122
freddie-gray-an-accident-witness-idUSKCN0Z21Z0 [https://perma.cc/W4KE-2CML] (“Allen recanted that statement in court, saying he never hear[d] loud banging, adding he was high on heroin
and Xanax when he gave his initial police report.”).
115
Fenton & Rector, supra note 86; Samee Ali, supra note 111.
116
Fenton & Rector, supra note 86 (quoting Judge Barry G. Williams).
117
See Samee Ali, supra note 111 (explaining the discovery of a second Brady violation).
118
Brian Witte, Baltimore Officer’s Trial Highlights Tensions Between Police, Prosecutors,
NBC4 WASH. (June 16, 2016), https://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/Judge-Police-OfficersTrial-to-Move-Forward-on-All-Charges-383286081.html [https://perma.cc/C8QB-W3D8].
119
Samee Ali, supra note 111.
120
Id.
121
Witte, supra note 118.
122
It is notable that the two Brady violations identified in the trial of Officer Goodson only
came to light because the lawyer for Donta Allen decided to come forward after watching the case
in the press, and the chief investigating officer, Detective Dawnyell Taylor, was sympathetic to

2226

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 59:2203

Initially, Brady might appear to be the opposite of a criminal doctrine
of faith. 123 By requiring prosecutors to turn over potentially exculpatory
evidence to the defense, the Supreme Court certainly suggested that it was
skeptical that prosecutors would fulfill their “special duty to seek justice,
not merely to convict” without some sort of intervention. 124 Unfortunately,
even as the Court sought to protect defendants from overzealous or unethical prosecutorial gamesmanship, the decision and its progeny were shaped
by the Court’s abiding faith that prosecutors could be trusted to voluntarily
and effectively execute their ethical obligations.
Although the Brady Court recognized that the suppression of evidence
favorable to an accused violated due process, it chose not to dictate a specific remedy to ensure that such failures didn’t recur. 125 Instead, the Court presumed that, once the constitutional obligation had been identified, prosecutors would “transcend” their adversarial role and turn over exculpatory evidence because their interest in winning their case would be trumped by their
desire and obligation to do justice. 126 Moreover, the Court did not require
that prosecutors voluntarily turn over all of the evidence at their disposal,
but only the evidence that they deemed “material either to guilt or to punishment.” 127 As the Court would later explain, for evidence to be “material”
it must not only be exculpatory, but it is must also be so persuasive that it
would cast doubt on the criminal conviction or sentence. 128
the officer-defendant. See Fenton & Rector, supra note 111 (detailing Donta Allen’s attorney’s
role in the discovery of misconduct); Baynard Woods, Police Rising, REAL NEWS NETWORK
(Nov. 30, 2017), https://therealnews.com/columns/print1130baltimorerising [https://perma.cc/
YMH5-B2ZX] (portraying Taylor’s sympathy for fellow members of her police union). If anything, the failure of the prosecution to satisfy its Brady obligations in the trials of the officers involved in the death of Freddie Gray raises the question: how do prosecutors behave in instances in
which the investigators and the media are uninterested in the outcome of the case? Samee Ali,
supra note 111 (referencing a quote from David Jaros). At one point during the trial, the Fraternal
Order of Police tweeted a meme of Leonardo DiCaprio in “The Great Gatsby” toasting with the
words, “Here’s to the Baltimore 6 Defense Team, The FOP and Detective Taylor.” Woods, supra.
See generally BALTIMORE RISING (HBO Films 2017) (showing Detective Taylor pumping her fist
when she heard news of Officer Goodson’s acquittal).
123
See Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Procedure Entitlements, Professionalism, and Lawyering
Norms, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 801, 824 (2000) (“Brady exists because trust of prosecutors to reveal
exculpatory evidence, even with clear ethical obligations, is an insufficient safeguard.” (footnote
omitted)).
124
Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 65–66 (2011) (quotations omitted).
125
See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 90–91 (stating the constitutional right implicated by withholding evidence but then ruling out a hypothetical remedy).
126
See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 n.6 (1985) (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87–
88).
127
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
128
See Bagley, 473 U.S at 678. Although the materiality standard delineated in Bagley ostensibly applies to the appellate review of alleged Brady violations, various jurisdictions have used it
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The Court’s decision to resolve the problem of prosecutors failing to
disclose exculpatory information by simply acknowledging their duty was,
by no means, the Court’s only option. First, the Court could have refused to
leave it to prosecutors to determine whether exculpatory evidence was “material.” 129 Alternatively, the Court could have adopted an even broader remedy and required “open file discovery,” a rule which would obligate prosecutors to reveal all of their evidence, both inculpatory and exculpatory, to
the defense. 130 Instead, the Court trusted that prosecutors’ sense of justice
would be sufficient to ensure that they would turn over evidence that would
reduce their chances of obtaining a conviction.
Although several of the Court’s Brady decisions involved intentional
failures to disclose, those decisions have largely downplayed the possibility
that a significant number of prosecutors would deliberately commit misconduct by hiding exculpatory evidence. 131 To be fair, it is difficult to devise a rule that would prevent a prosecutor from deliberately burying evidence. While Brady failures continue to be unearthed with troubling frequency, 132 the practical challenges to uncovering what a prosecutor chooses
not to reveal are enormous. 133
to define the prosecutor’s discovery obligations at the trial level. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Disclosure Obligations, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1325 (2011) (describing the materiality
standard as a “source of significant and ongoing controversy, because in many jurisdictions, this
standard for reversal on appeal is also utilized as the standard for defining the duty to provide
pretrial disclosure of information”).
129
See generally Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481
(2009) (detailing the benefits of a prophylactic rule requiring disclosure of all exculpatory evidence regardless of materiality, but ultimately advocating for a broader rule requiring “open file
discovery”); Colin Starger, Expanding Stare Decisis: The Role of Precedent in the Unfolding
Dialectic of Brady v. Maryland, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 77, 128–44 (2012) (tracing the Supreme
Court’s sharp internal debate over interpretation of materiality culminating in Bagley).
130
See Burke, supra note 129, at 519 (“[T]his Article has urged a prophylactic rule requiring
open file discovery in which prosecutors disclose not only exculpatory evidence, but all of the
evidence against the defendant.”); Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1533, 1557 (2010) (“The best way to guarantee that defendants obtain the exculpatory
evidence owed to them under Brady is to require ‘open file discovery’ where prosecutors must
turn over all evidence known to the government, exculpatory and inculpatory alike.”); Starger,
supra note 129 (highlighting dissents in the Brady line of Supreme Court cases where individual
Justices pushed for broader interpretation of obligation to disclose).
131
See, e.g., Connick, 563 U.S. at 65–66 (describing presumption that prosecutors seek justice
rather than wins); Bagley, 473 U.S. at 685 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the Court’s
holding that the prosecutor’s deliberate failure to disclose impeachment evidence was “harmless
error”).
132
See Medwed, supra note 130, at 1539, 1551 (explaining that “Brady violations take place
with regularity” and that “[a]lthough intentional Brady violations by bad actors are the exception
rather than the rule, the annals of criminal law are sufficiently rife with anecdotes of this misbehavior to cause concern”); Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for
Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 698 (1987) (“[A] disturbingly large num-
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Unfortunately, the Court’s faith in prosecutors helped shape rules that
not only make it easier for prosecutors acting in bad faith to deliberately
suppress exculpatory evidence, but also increase the likelihood that wellintentioned prosecutors will suppress such evidence inadvertently. By leaving decisions about materiality to the discretion of prosecutors, the Court
provided cover for “bad actors” to argue that they simply thought the evidence, although exculpatory, was not material. 134 In 1985, in United States
v. Bagley, the defendant discovered that the prosecutor had failed to turn
over exculpatory evidence that the defense had specifically requested. 135
The Supreme Court, however, ruled that even the deliberate suppression of
potentially exculpatory evidence was irrelevant if the evidence was subsequently deemed to be immaterial. 136 While the Court may believe that “the
prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure,” 137 the rule crafted in Brady and its progeny provides ample wiggle
room for unethical attorneys to ignore their discovery obligations. 138
Perhaps the greater danger is that the Court’s faith in prosecutors shaped
a rule which increased the odds that well-intentioned prosecutors, confident
ber of published opinions indicate that prosecutors knowingly presented false evidence or deliberately suppressed unquestionably exculpatory evidence.”); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It Is Time to Take Prosecution Discipline Seriously, 8 U. D.C. L. REV. 275, 278, 285 (2004)
(explaining that prosecutorial misconduct, primarily failing to turn over exculpatory evidence,
contributed to forty-five percent of the exonerated clients represented first wrought by the Innocence Project and suggesting that these violations were “merely the tip of the iceberg”).
133
See Sara Gurwitch, When Self-Policing Does Not Work: A Proposal for Policing Prosecutors in Their Obligation to Provide Exculpatory Evidence to the Defense, 50 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 303, 306–07 (2010) (“The type of full-scale re-investigation that is typically necessary to
discover previously suppressed exculpatory evidence post-conviction is rarely conducted.”);
Medwed, supra note 130, at 1548 (“Discretionary decisions by prosecutors, like disclosure choices . . . are not made in courtrooms or during formal negotiations with defense counsel, but behind
closed doors far from the prying eyes of defendants, judges, and state ethics boards.”).
134
See Medwed, supra note 130, at 1544 (considering the likelihood of non-disclosure by
both good and bad actors); Yaroshefsky, supra note 132, at 296 (describing the reluctance of
courts and discipline boards to second guess prosecutors’ discretionary decisions).
135
See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 669–70, 671–72 (detailing the evidence requested and provided,
and then the eventual discovery of the requested evidence during the appeals process that was
withheld).
136
Id. at 683 (holding that the reviewing court should consider the materiality of the evidence
suppressed); id. at 714 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s analysis reduces the significance
of deliberate prosecutorial suppression of potentially exculpatory evidence to that merely of one of
numerous factors that ‘may’ be considered by a reviewing court.”).
137
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,
439 (1995) (“This means, naturally, that a prosecutor anxious about tacking too close to the wind
will disclose a favorable piece of evidence.” (citing Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108)).
138
See, e.g., Bagley, 473 U.S. at 706 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (explaining that the materiality
requirement in Brady encourages prosecutors “to gamble on a finding of harmlessness” and “provides the prosecutor with ample room to withhold favorable evidence”).
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in the strength of their case and the guilt of their defendants, might mistakenly determine that exculpatory evidence need not be turned over to the defense. Prosecutors are tasked with seeking justice and ensuring that defendants receive fair process. 139 But they also are encouraged to vigorously pursue convictions and to make sure the guilty do not go free. 140 The result is
that prosecutors are particularly vulnerable to cognitive bias interfering with
their evaluation of whether evidence is both material and exculpatory. 141 By
allowing prosecutors to withhold nonmaterial exculpatory evidence, the
Court trusted that prosecutors would not only be motivated to satisfy the
demands of due process, but also would be capable of making such highly
discretionary decisions accurately in the face of powerful and often unconscious incentives to find that such evidence need not be disclosed. 142
C. Faith Across the Criminal Process
Brady, Kastigar, and Wardlow are not criminal procedure outliers. Indeed, a quick survey of landmark Supreme Court decisions reveals a substantial number of doctrines predicated on faith in the system and its actors.
Moreover, these doctrines of faith are not limited to one particular area, but
rather span the entire criminal process. From investigation and pretrial discovery to the trial itself, one can find examples of doctrines that have been
139

See Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 399, 405 (“In this role as a
minister of justice, the prosecutor has the responsibility ‘not simply . . . of an advocate,’ but to
adopt a somewhat neutral stance ‘to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that
guilt is decided upon the basis of the sufficient evidence.’” (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2003)) (citing United States v. Kalfayan, 8 F.3d 1315,
1323 (9th Cir. 1993))).
140
Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464,
2471 (2004) (“[P]rosecutors want to ensure convictions . . . . Favorable win-loss statistics boost
prosecutors’ egos, their esteem, their praise by colleagues, and their prospects for promotion and
career advancement.”); see also Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355, 390 (2001) (“The desire to win inevitably wins out over matters of procedural fairness, such as disclosure.”).
141
See Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1590–91 (2006) (describing how cognitive bias can
affect the exercise of prosecutorial discretionary decisions); Susan S. Kuo & C.W. Taylor, In
Prosecutors We Trust: UK Lessons for Illinois Disclosure, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 695, 706–07
(2007) (“The desire to win a case may cause some prosecutors to concentrate their sights solely on
achieving victory, at the expense of upholding justice. The quest for success can affect a prosecutor’s ability to objectively weigh the materiality of potentially exculpatory evidence, a phenomenon referred to as ‘tunnel vision’ or ‘confirmatory bias.’” (footnote omitted)).
142
See Medwed, supra note 130, at 1551 (“The most pressing problem relates to how wellmeaning prosecutors tend to interpret their constitutional disclosure obligations in a way that all
too often leads to withholding.”).
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shaped by the Court’s belief that prosecutors and the police “dutifully carry
out their obligations within constitutional limits.” 143
At the early stages of the criminal process, the Court has allowed officers to deliberately create exigent circumstances “with the bad faith intent” of avoiding the warrant requirement, excused the unlawful detention
of suspects if the officer subsequently discovers a warrant, and endorsed
pretextual traffic stops despite concerns that the practice could invite racial
profiling. 144 During pretrial discovery, prosecutors are trusted to evaluate
their evidence and decide for themselves what they should be obligated to
turn over to the defense. 145 At trial, prosecutors can deny defendants the
opportunity to waive a jury. 146 Then, when picking that jury, prosecutors can
offer an “implausible or fantastic” justification for striking a juror and their
reason need not make sense so long as it is held to be race neutral. 147 At
each stage of the criminal process, one finds doctrines built on the presumption that police and prosecutors understand their legal obligations and can
be trusted to act with integrity and honesty. 148
Yet, although it is relatively easy to identify Criminal Doctrines of
Faith throughout the criminal process, it is more difficult to discern the basis for the Court’s trust. While some decisions betray an idealistic view of
how police and prosecutors behave, others appear to be shaped by the
Court’s belief that institutional checks will prevent criminal justice actors
from abusing their authority. To further complicate the inquiry, some decisions may be shaped by a faith in the system and its actors that is derived
from more than one source.

143
E.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 165 F.3d 380, 389 (5th Cir. 1999) (framing the Fourth
Amendment as a check on the power of the police), vacated en banc, 171 F.3d 258 (5th Cir.
1999).
144
See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016) (holding that discovering a warrant validated evidence seized after an unlawful detention); Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 464 (2011)
(invalidating a subjective test of “bad faith intent”); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810-11
(1996) (rejecting the concerns of petitioners—black men—that police pull over certain individuals
committing common traffic violations on pretext and not to actually enforce the traffic laws); see
also Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 431 (1997) (“Empirical evidence suggests that race is frequently the defining factor in pretextual traffic stops.”).
145
See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 671 (detailing what the prosecution did not turn over in response
to defendant’s pretrial discovery request).
146
Singer, 380 U.S. at 36–37.
147
See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768–69 (1995) (holding that the prosecutor’s strike of a
black juror could be justified and found race neutral when the juror was struck on the basis that he
had “long, unkempt hair, a mustache, and a beard”).
148
See, e.g., Singer, 380 U.S. at 37 (referencing the Court’s “confidence in the integrity of the
federal prosecutor” to support its decision to allow prosecutors to compel a defendant to have a
jury trial).
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The following section examines some of the Court’s most prominent
criminal procedure decisions and identifies three potential sources of faith for
the doctrines established by those cases. After disaggregating the Court’s potential justifications for trusting police and prosecutors, the subsequent section explores what it might mean if the Court’s faith proves to be misplaced.
II. THREE SOURCES OF FAITH IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DOCTRINE
A. Faith in Character
Scholars have explored multiple rationales for the Court’s deference to
police and prosecutors. 149 In some instances, separation of powers concerns
deter courts from interfering in the daily work of law enforcement. 150 Other
times, the Court’s reluctance to act stems from its presumption that the police have a special expertise that warrants deference to their “street level”
decisions. 151 There exists, however, an additional rationale that has largely
gone unacknowledged— that the Court’s doctrine may be built, in part, on
its faith in the strength of character of these criminal justice actors.
149
See, e.g., Lvovsky, supra note 10, at 1997–98 (summarizing existing criticism of the
Court’s reliance on police expertise); Stoughton, supra note 10, at 848–49 (identifying and challenging the Supreme Court’s factual presumptions about the nature of policing).
150
See Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV.
989, 1025 (2006) (“The Supreme Court is of the view that a prosecutor’s charging and plea bargaining decisions are largely off limits from judicial review.”); David M. Jaros & Adam S. Zimmerman, Judging Aggregate Settlement, 94 WASH. U.L. REV. 545, 590 (2017) (“[C]onstitutional
concerns regarding the separation of powers also impede the judiciary from seizing control of the
settlement process.”).
151
See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (“[A] police officer views the
facts through the lens of his police experience and expertise.”); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.
411, 418 (1981) (“[A] trained officer draws inferences and makes deductions—inferences and
deductions that might well elude an untrained person.”); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 n.2
(1979) (“This situation is to be distinguished from the observations of a trained, experienced police officer who is able to perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to the untrained observer.”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 33 (1968) (“Officer McFadden
had no probable cause to arrest Terry for anything, but he had observed circumstances that would
reasonably lead an experienced, prudent policeman to suspect that Terry was about to engage in
burglary or robbery.” (emphasis added)); see also Lvovsky, supra note 10, at 1997–98 (describing
the Court’s view of the police as experts); Eric J. Miller, Detective Fiction: Race, Authority, and
the Fourth Amendment, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 213, 227 (2012) (“Police training and experience thus
establishes the police as craftsmen members of a specialized guild, one that the Court has granted
something of a monopoly on evaluating the significance of criminogenic evidence. The rest of us,
including the judiciary, lack this specialized guild knowledge and so should defer to the on-thestreet judgments of police experts.”); L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth
Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2063 (2011) (“The Court’s behavioral assumption is that
officers, based upon their experiences, are better than civilians at distinguishing innocent from
guilty conduct. Presumably, as frequent observers of behavior, officers are better equipped to
predict whether an individual’s behavior signals involvement in criminal activity.”).
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The idea that police and prosecutors follow a “moral code” is deeply
embedded in popular culture. 152 In many respects, the recurring explanation
that prosecutors and police officers who violate the rules are “bad apples”
implies that the vast majority of law enforcement actors can be trusted to
obey both the letter and spirit of the law. 153 This faith in law enforcement
plays out in three interrelated assumptions: (1) police and prosecutors do
not regularly engage in misconduct in the course of their duties; (2) they
will voluntarily follow the constitutional rules promulgated by the Court;
and, (3) they are not only willing to follow, but are also capable of following, those constitutional rules.
Although it is never explicitly acknowledged, the Court’s assumption
that the police do not regularly engage in misconduct is essential to decisions like Illinois v. Wardlow. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s determination that
flight from the police is “suggestive” of criminality is premised on a world
in which police officers do not regularly harass individuals when they en152

See Anthony V. Alfieri, Community Prosecutors, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1465, 1504 (2002)
(describing “[g]ood prosecutors . . . [as] the virtuous agents of justice and the celebrants of truth”);
see also Brian M. Murray, Prosecutorial Responsibility and Collateral Consequences, 12 STAN. J.
CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 213, 240 (2016) (“Constitutional criminal process jurisprudence already views the prosecutor as a special agent of justice.”); Ronald M. Sandgrund, Dialogue: Does
Popular Culture Influence Lawyers, Judges, and Juries?—Part III, 44 COLO. LAWYER 51, 54
(Mar. 2015) (“Generally speaking, TV pits ‘good guy’ prosecutors against ‘bad guy’ defense attorneys, and places prosecutors, as opposed to defense attorneys, on the moral high ground of the
legal practice.”).
153
See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 618 (1999) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“My sincere respect for the competence of the typical member of the law enforcement profession precludes my assent to the suggestion that a reasonable officer could have
believed that bringing members of the media into a home during the execution of an arrest warrant
was lawful.”); Bruce Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 51, 52 (2016) (describing the assumption that “intentional prosecutorial lawbreaking was aberrational, the fault of rogue prosecutors—‘a few bad apples’” (citation omitted));
Aliza Chasin, Jersey City Suspends Officers Who Kicked Victim on Fire After Crash, Two Deputy
Chiefs Transferred, WPIX 11 NEWS (June 12, 2017), http://pix11.com/2017/06/12/jersey-citysuspends-officers-who-kicked-victim-on-fire-after-crash-transfers-others/ [https://web.archive.org/
web/20170911085039/https://pix11.com/2017/06/12/jersey-city-suspends-officers-who-kickedvictim-on-fire-after-crash-transfers-others/] (“Look, we have a high standard for the police department . . . . They do a tremendous job. We’re not going to let just a few bad apples be a reflection on the entire police department or the entire city[,]” quoting Jersey City Mayor Steven
Fulop’s response to four officers beating an innocent bystander); Ferguson Mayor Says ‘Bad Apples’ Not Indicative of Police Dept., NBS NIGHTLY NEWS WITH LESTER HOLT (Mar. 13, 2015),
https://www.nbcnews.com/nightly-news/video/ferguson-mayor-says-bad-apples-not-indicative-ofpolice-dept-412990019892 [https://perma.cc/V2SM-JYPS] (characterizing disparate racial impact
of police actions or racial bias within the police department as due to a few “bad apples”); see also
Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Police Accountability (HBO television broadcast Oct. 2,
2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zaD84DTGULo [https://perma.cc/6457-EDTG] (highlighting community calls for accountability that are met with the “just a few bad apples” argument).
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gage in non-criminal activities. 154 If a sufficient number of police officers
intimidate, abuse, take property, or otherwise mistreat law-abiding citizens,
then the foundation of the Wardlow doctrine collapses. 155 Notably, the assumption that police officers do not commit such misconduct is separate
from the assumption that the police willingly follow the constitutional limits
the Court places upon their activities. Viewed narrowly, Wardlow only involved a determination about what constituted reasonable suspicion. 156 The
critical assumption in Wardlow—that the police do not mistreat the public—
is separate from the particular rule that the Court established, yet it was an
essential prerequisite to the decision. Nor was it the only assumption about
the moral character of law enforcement embedded in Wardlow. In addition
to assuming that law abiding citizens would not have good reasons to run
from the police, the Court made a second assumption about moral character—that, once established, the police can be trusted not to subvert the constitutional restrictions that the Court places on them.
Seth Stoughton, a legal scholar and a former police officer, noted in his
article, Policing Facts, that “[t]he Court has only rarely credited fears that
police officers will attempt to circumscribe the constitutional limits to their
authority.” 157 In Wardlow, the Court assumed that officers would diligently
adhere to the rules it had been refining since 1968 when Terry v. Ohio required that officers restrain themselves from seizing a suspect if they lacked
reasonable suspicion. 158 What went unacknowledged in the decision was the
possibility that the Court’s explanations might be used by officers to tailor
their testimony to ensure the admissibility of evidence they recovered under
questionable circumstances.

154
See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (holding that flight may be a factor
when police calculate reasonable suspicion); see supra notes 49–79 and accompanying text.
155
See, e.g., Dan Rodricks, The High Cost of Bad Cops, BALT. SUN, (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.
baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/dan-rodricks-blog/bs-md-rodricks-0107-story.html [https://web.
archive.org/web/20180910040139/http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/dan-rodricksblog/bs-md-rodricks-0107-story.html] (describing revelations that officers in the Baltimore Gun
Trace Task Force were robbing and assaulting members of the public, selling drugs, planting evidence, and writing false reports, and how that impacted the public’s trust).
156
See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (drawing the boundaries around what factors can influence
a finding of reasonable suspicion).
157
Stoughton, supra note 10, at 861; see also Anthony O’Rourke, Structural Overdelegation
in Criminal Procedure, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 407, 411 (2013) (“[T]he court may underestimate the extent to which law enforcement officials are unable or unwilling to implement a
constitutional objective, and might therefore use the discretion they are accorded to undermine the
objective.”)
158
Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (establishing that the police must have reasonable suspicion to seize
a suspect).
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One might well argue that, in the case of Wardlow, the Court had few
options other than trusting the police to follow its instructions, but the same
cannot be said of its decision in 2016 in Utah v. Strieff. In Strieff, the Court
refused to suppress the fruit of an unlawful search because the officer subsequently discovered that the defendant, whom he had unlawfully stopped,
had an outstanding warrant for a traffic violation. 159 While the majority was
quick to chalk up the officer’s Fourth Amendment violation to “two goodfaith mistakes,” 160 the dissenters took a more skeptical view. Justice Elena
Kagan described the stop as a “calculated decision . . . designed for investigatory purposes.” 161 In a striking acknowledgement of the possibility that
the police might deliberately circumvent the Court’s Fourth Amendment
protections, another dissenter, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, stressed that such
strategic violations of the Fourth Amendment were not “isolated instance[s]
of negligence,” but rather were “the product of institutionalized training
procedures.” 162 Justice Sotomayor’s acknowledgement that many officers
are taught to “stop and question first, develop reasonable suspicion later”
was particularly notable in light of the majority’s refusal to acknowledge
the possibility that the police might deliberately sidestep the Fourth
Amendment protections established by the Court’s own decisions. 163
Strieff is not the only case where the majority of the Court conspicuously failed to acknowledge the possibility that the police might purposely
circumvent or openly violate constitutional rules. In 1980, in United States
v. Mendenhall, the majority was torn between concluding that Federal
Agents had reasonable suspicion to seize Ms. Mendenhall between airline
flights and escort her to a DEA office for a strip-search and concluding that
no seizure ever took place because Ms. Mendenhall voluntarily accompanied the officers to be searched. 164 Although the conclusion of Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger and Justices Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and Harry Blackmun
that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Ms. Mendenhall is debatable, it was the determination by the remainder of the majority that the defendant voluntarily chose to forego her connecting flight and instead elected

159

Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016).
Id. at 2063 (“In stopping Strieff, Officer Fackrell made two good-faith mistakes.”).
161
Id. at 2072 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
162
Id. at 2063; id. at 2069 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
163
Id. at 2069 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The New York City Police Department long
trained officers to, in the words of a District Judge, ‘stop and question first, develop reasonable
suspicion later.’” (quoting Ligon v. New York, 925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2013))).
164
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555, 560 (1980) (finding that Ms. Mendenhall
was not seized for Fourth Amendment purposes, and that the actions of law enforcement complied
with Fourth Amendment standards).
160
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to take part in a strip search that demonstrated the Court’s deep and abiding
faith in the character of the police.
Finding that “nothing in the record suggests that . . . [Ms. Mendenhall]
had any objective reason to believe that she was not free to end the conversation in the concourse and proceed on her way,” Justice Stewart and thenJustice Rehnquist assumed that a “reasonable person” could trust that the
officers would respect her decision to invoke her Fourth Amendment
rights. 165 In fact, as the dissent noted, the agents conceded that Ms.
Mendenhall would have been forcibly restrained if she had refused their
“request.” 166 If one acknowledges a world in which police officers ignore
the invocation of constitutional rights, the finding that Ms. Mendenhall
“freely and voluntarily” consented to her detention and search becomes dubious at best. The majority’s faith in police officers’ moral character and its
presumption that officers dutifully follow the constitutional rules established by the Court is thus an unspoken but critical component of the
Court’s decisions allowing for the voluntary waiver of constitutional rights.
If one were to acknowledge that suspects reasonably expect that their invocation of constitutional rights will be ignored, then waivers of those rights
can hardly be deemed “voluntary.” 167
In addition to assuming that the police conscientiously follow the
Court’s constitutional mandates, the Court also maintains its faith in the
capacity of law enforcement to follow the complex doctrines the Court has
established. In her article, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise,
Anna Lvovsky describes how both lower and appellate courts have embraced the idea that police have specialized expertise and knowledge that
deserve the courts’ deference and respect. 168 As Lvovsky explains, the idea
that the police possess unique experiences and training that give them superior abilities to detect and appropriately respond to criminal activity (and
danger) has shaped the Fourth Amendment doctrines that ostensibly regu-

165

See id. at 554–55 (defining Fourth Amendment seizure from the view of a “reasonable
person” with the “reasonable person” as the one seized).
166
Id. at 576 (White, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, the only testimony concerning what occurred
between Agent Anderson’s ‘request’ and Ms. Mendenhall’s arrival at the DEA office is the
agent’s testimony that if Ms. Mendenhall had wanted to leave at that point she would have been
forcibly restrained.”).
167
See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 472–73 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring in
the judgment) (“When a suspect understands his (expressed) wishes to have been ignored . . . in
contravention of the ‘rights’ just read to him by his interrogator, he may well see further objection
as futile and confession (true or not) as the only way to end his interrogation.”).
168
See Lvovsky, supra note 10 at 1998–99 (outlining the growing respect afforded to the
police by the judiciary).
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late police behavior. 169 The Court’s faith in the police’s exceptional competence, however, is not limited to their crime fighting skills. Embedded implicitly in its decisions is the Court’s presumption that the police can learn
and apply the complex legal doctrines that it outlines in its cases. 170 Thus,
the Court assumes that officers on the beat can appreciate not only the distinctions between “reasonable suspicion” and “probable cause” but also
how those distinctions affect their authority to stop, detain, and arrest.
The Court’s faith in prosecutors, reflected in cases like Brady v. Maryland in 1963 and Kastigar v. United States in 1972 closely mirrors the assumptions it made about police officers in cases like Wardlow: (1) they do
not commit misconduct; (2) they diligently follow Court imposed constitutional limits; and (3) they are capable of applying complicated legal rules to
their everyday practice.
Although Brady and its progeny outlined prosecutors’ constitutional
obligation to turn over exculpatory evidence that is “material,” those decisions presumed that, once informed of their discovery obligations, prosecutors would diligently seek to satisfy them. 171 Although evidence suggests
that Brady violations are “more than episodic” and that “scores of innocent
people have been convicted by those violations,” there is no way to know
how many such failures are due to prosecutors consciously disregarding
their ethical responsibilities. 172 What is clear is that because the Court had
sufficient faith that prosecutors would transcend their adversarial role if told
to do so, it created no mechanism to ensure compliance with the Court’s
requirements and left it to the prosecutors themselves to decide whether
evidence was both material and exculpatory. 173
169
Id. at 2025 (“Tracking closely with the rise of the police expert witness, judges also began
invoking the police’s criminological insights as grounds for deference under the Fourth Amendment.”).
170
Occasionally, the Court makes the presumption explicitly. See, e.g., Davis, 564 U.S. at 241
(“Responsible law enforcement officers will take care to learn ‘what is required of them’ under
Fourth Amendment precedent and will conform their conduct to these rules.” (citation omitted)).
171
See supra notes 111–142 and accompanying text.
172
Barry Scheck, Four Reforms for the Twenty-First Century, 96 JUDICATURE 323, 330
(2013); see Kuo & Taylor, supra note 141, at 705 (suggesting that some Brady failures “arise from
the prosecution’s deliberate decision to withhold information from the defense” and citing several
notable examples).
173
See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 n.6 (1985) (“The Court has recognized,
however, that the prosecutor’s role transcends that of an adversary: he ‘is the representative not of
an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty . . . whose interest . . . in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.’” (quoting Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963))); Bennett
L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors Play, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
531, 533 (2007) (“Brady depends on the integrity, good faith, and professionalism of the prosecutor for its effectiveness.”).
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The Court’s belief that prosecutors would diligently follow Court imposed constitutional limits and subvert their desire to win in favor of their
loyalty to truth and the law was similarly evidenced in Kastigar. As discussed above, Kastigar requires that prosecutors prove to the court that the
evidence they seek to use is not the product of the defendant’s coerced testimony. 174 In practice, this requirement offers defendants little solace. As
the dissent in Kastigar noted, because defendants are in a poor position to
demonstrate that the prosecutor’s evidence was not acquired independently,
the government will likely have little difficulty satisfying its burden. 175 Justice Marshall explained, “The good faith of the prosecuting authorities is
thus the sole safeguard of the witness’ rights.” 176
Brady and Kastigar also reflect the Court’s belief that prosecutors are
not only willing to follow the Court’s constitutional directives, but they are
also capable of doing so. There is a very real danger that prosecutors, anxious to ensure that guilty defendants do not go free and incentivized professionally to obtain “wins,” will persuade “themselves that a satisfactory reason justifies not providing the exculpatory evidence, such as ‘the defense
must have discovered it themselves,’ or ‘it is just an aberration and does not
really undercut the prosecution’s case.’” 177 Similarly, as the dissent noted in
Kastigar, prosecutors may not be aware that fellow prosecutors or investigators who have worked on the case have either deliberately or, perhaps, inadvertently made use of the compelled testimony. 178
B. Faith in Institutions
While the Court’s decisions appear to place great faith in the moral
character of police and prosecutors, there may be an alternative explanation
for its willingness to trust law enforcement to do the right thing—the
Court’s faith in the institutions in which those actors work. In Hudson v.
Michigan, the Supreme Court rejected a categorical rule excluding evidence
obtained in violation of its “knock and announce” rule stating, “[a]s long
ago as 1980 we felt it proper to ‘assume’ that unlawful police behavior

174

See supra notes 94–108 and accompanying text.
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 469 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
176
Id.
177
Laurie L. Levenson, Police Corruption and New Models for Reform, 35 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 1, 34 (2001); see also Bibas, supra note 140, at 2471 (discussing the professional pressures
on prosecutors); Burke, supra note 141, at 1590–91 (describing how cognitive bias can affect
prosecutorial discretion).
178
Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 469 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
175

2238

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 59:2203

would ‘be dealt with appropriately’ by the authorities.” 179 Similarly, despite
a “flagrantly illegal search,” the Court, in United States v. Payner, reinstated
the defendant’s conviction explaining that lower courts should not “assume
that similar lawless conduct, if brought to the attention of responsible officials, would not be dealt with appropriately.” 180 Thus, it may be that the
Court’s faith is not in the individual moral strength of police and prosecutors, but rather in the institutional capacity of administrative agencies to
effectively regulate the behavior of their members.
Just as the Hudson Court relied on “internal police discipline” to ensure that officers would “take the constitutional rights of citizens seriously,”
the Court has dismissed concerns about prosecutorial misconduct by assuming that prosecutor offices would adopt policies and disciplinary procedures
to regulate themselves. 181 In 2017, in Turner v. United States, the Court was
reassured that prosecutors who had failed to turn over exculpatory evidence
to the defense had adopted a new “generous policy of discovery” to ensure
that they would meet their future Brady obligations. 182 Similarly, in 1983, in
United States v. Hasting, the Court admonished the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals for reversing a conviction when the prosecutor had commented at
trial on the defendants’ failure to testify, suggesting, instead, that the court
should have relied on the Department of Justice’s internal disciplinary procedures to deal with the problem. 183

179
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598–99 (2006) (quoting United States v. Payner, 447
U.S. 727, 733 n.5 (1980)) (internal quotations and lack of irony omitted).
180
Payner, 447 U.S. at 733 n.5; see also Eric J. Miller, Detective Fiction: Race, Authority,
and the Fourth Amendment, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 213, 219–20 (2012) (explaining that the Court presumes that “superior officers transmit respect for the Constitution and fourth-amendment norms to
their inferior officers, and punish failures to abide by the requirements (including the constitutional requirements) of police professionalism” (footnote omitted)).
181
See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 598–99 (implying faith in a more professionalized police force).
Although the Court has generally assumed that existing administrative controls are sufficient to
effectively regulate prosecutors, some scholars have proposed reforms to increase internal oversight and diminish the risk that prosecutors will commit misconduct or abuse their considerable
discretion. See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors:
Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869 (2009) (proposing a model that spreads
certain functions of a prosecutor office among different types of prosecutors); Stephanos Bibas,
Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959 (2009) (promoting the use of internal business-like incentives to change the culture of prosecutors’ offices).
182
Turner v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1885, 1893 (2017) (“[T]he Government assured the
Court at oral argument that subsequent to petitioners’ trial, it ha[d] adopted a generous policy of
discovery in criminal cases under which it discloses any information that a defendant might wish
to use.”).
183
United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 506 n.5 (1983) (suggesting the circuit court “could
have dealt with the offending argument . . . by asking the Department of Justice to initiate a disciplinary proceeding against [the prosecutor]” (citation omitted)).
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In addition to relying on prosecutor offices to discipline attorneys who
commit misconduct, the Court has cited the ethical demands of the bar as
further reason to trust prosecutors to follow the law. 184 In 1976, in Imbler v.
Pachtman, the Court explained that the public need not fear prosecutorial
misconduct because “a prosecutor stands perhaps unique, among officials
whose acts could deprive persons of constitutional rights, in his amenability
to professional discipline by an association of his peers.” 185 In 2011, in
Connick v. Thompson, the Court went so far as to find that a District Attorney was excused from providing the attorneys who worked for him “formal
in-house training about how to obey the law” because he was “entitled to
rely on prosecutors’ professional training and ethical obligations . . . to prevent . . . constitutional violations.” 186 Unfortunately, the wisdom of the
Court’s reliance on the bar to ensure that prosecutors heed their ethical (and
constitutionally mandated) duties may be more dubious than the case law
suggests. In fact, multiple studies suggest that prosecutors are rarely disciplined by the bar even after appellate courts identified “prosecutorial misconduct [that] led to dismissals, sentence reductions, or reversals . . . .” 187
To some extent, the exclusionary rule, one of the most prominent remedies crafted by the Court to regulate police and prosecutors, is premised on
the idea that law enforcement institutions will penalize members who hamper successful prosecutions by failing to follow the Court’s constitutional

184
See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 66 (2011) (finding that the District Attorney was
entitled to presume that his prosecutors would understand and fulfill their Brady obligations, because “[a]n attorney who violates his or her ethical obligations is subject to professional discipline, including sanctions, suspension, and disbarment”); Lesley E. Williams, The Civil Regulation of Prosecutors, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3441, 3441 (1999) (“The availability of discipline by
professional associations in cases of prosecutorial misconduct encouraged the Supreme Court to
grant prosecutors absolute immunity for trial-related activities under § 1983.”).
185
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976).
186
Connick, 563 U.S. at 66–67.
187
Shima Baradaran Baughman, Subconstitutional Checks, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1071,
1097 (2017) (noting that “over 2000 cases from 1970 to 2003 where prosecutorial misconduct led
to dismissals, sentence reductions, or reversals, prosecutors were disciplined in only forty-four of
those cases”); see also Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts of
Interest, 58 B.C. L. REV. 463, 485 (2017) (“Prosecutors are rarely disciplined for anything . . . .”);
David Keenan, Deborah Jane Cooper, David Lebowitz & Tamar Lerer, The Myth of Prosecutorial
Accountability After Connick v. Thompson: Why Existing Professional Responsibility Measures
Cannot Protect Against Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 203, 220 (2011),
http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-myth-of-prosecutorial-accountability-after-connick-vthompson-why-existing-professional-responsibility-measures-cannot-protect-againstprosecutorial-misconduct [https://perma.cc/9KLW-HJC4] (describing multiple studies in which
the bar failed to discipline prosecutors after their misconduct had been identified by the courts).
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rules. 188 The effectiveness of the exclusionary rule as a deterrent depends on
a number of assumptions. 189 Chief among them is the notion that law enforcement actors are personally invested in the success of the criminal
case—either out of a desire for justice or because of their own personal interests. 190 Yet, there are reasons to question to what extent police departments and prosecutor offices actually incentivize their employees to follow
their own internal policies and the law. 191
As former law enforcement officer and legal scholar Seth Stoughton
has described, “officers are under no formal pressure to concern themselves
with convictions, and there is informal discouragement of such concern.” 192
Although often anecdotal, there is considerable support for the proposition
that officers are encouraged to focus not on the admissibility of evidence
but on making arrests. 193 As one officer explained, “[My supervisor] really
likes arrests, and I give them to him . . . . I don’t give a shit if they [the
state’s attorney’s office] won’t take it. That’s their problem.” 194 Similarly,
while prosecutors ostensibly are governed by not only internal policies but
also the ethical rules that govern all attorneys, “few observers of [the] system have confidence that [internal regulation] serves as an adequate mechanism for ensuring prosecutorial accountability.” 195
188
See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (“The rule is calculated to prevent,
not to repair. Its purpose is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only
effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.”).
189
See, e.g., Eugene R. Milhizer, Debunking Five Great Myths About the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule, 211 MIL. L. REV. 211, 229–30 (2012) (offering seven distinct reasons why the
exclusionary rule might not deter police misconduct).
190
See, e.g., George M. Dery III, Allowing “Lawless Police Conduct” in Order to Forbid
“Lawless Civilian Conduct”: The Court Further Erodes the Exclusionary Rule in Utah v. Strieff,
44 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 393, 428 (2017) (“When the exclusionary rule’s costs are visited upon
the individual officer, he or she will suffer in a personal and pragmatic way. Lost cases due to
exclusion of evidence, particularly if they continue to occur, could cause individual upset, loss of
professional reputation, and even damage to career prospects. Patterns of failure reflect poorly on
leadership, which feel the pressure to discipline or at the very least educate.”).
191
See, e.g., Fred Klein, A View from Inside the Ropes: A Prosecutor’s Viewpoint on Disclosing Exculpatory Evidence, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 867, 876 (2010) (“I would not be the first to suggest that the failure to disclose exculpatory information results from an office culture that rewards
convictions and breeds an attitude that the prosecution is engaged in a battle against the guilty, so
the ends justify the means.”).
192
Stoughton, supra note 10, at 877.
193
Id. at 877–82 (describing officer indifference to conviction rates and the failure of police
agencies to discipline officers whose errors prevent convictions).
194
PETER MOSKOS, COP IN THE HOOD: MY YEAR POLICING BALTIMORE’S EASTERN DISTRICT 44 (2008).
195
Yaroshefsky, supra note 132, at 289; see Bibas, supra note 181, at 976 (“One empirical
survey found that state bar authorities had reviewed only fourteen cases in six years in which
prosecutors had suppressed exculpatory or impeachment evidence.”); Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 722–23 (2006) (“The absence of signifi-
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There remains, however, a third possible explanation for the faith in
police and prosecutors that has shaped the Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence. It may be that the Court relies, not on the moral character of police and prosecutors nor on the restraints imposed by the institutions in
which they work, but rather on the judiciary’s ability to effectively deter
misconduct and ensure that constitutional rules are followed.
C. Faith in the Courts
The Court may not believe that police and prosecutors are especially
trustworthy or that the institutions within which they work are particularly
effective at restraining their behavior. Instead, the Court may have faith in the
judicial system to deter misconduct and identify those instances in which police or prosecutors break constitutional rules. Arguably, the three doctrinal
criminal procedure cases that played pivotal roles in the Freddie Gray trials—
Brady, Kastigar, and Wardlow—assumed, not that all police and prosecutors would diligently follow the constitutional rules dictated by the Court,
but rather that the courts could effectively root out and remedy those instances in which those rules were violated.
In Kastigar, the Court did not merely identify the State’s obligation to
refrain from using the defendant’s compelled statement and evidence derived from the compelled statement. 196 It also placed on the prosecution the
“heavy burden” of proving to the trial court that “all of the evidence it propose[d] to use was derived from legitimate independent sources.” 197 At first
blush, Kastigar might appear skeptical of prosecutors—adopting a “trust
but verify” approach rather than just assuming that prosecutors would voluntarily refrain from using “fruit” of the compelled testimony against the
defendant. This view, however, is predicated on the assumption that trial
courts can ferret out those instances when the compelled testimony has bled
into the defendant’s trial.
Although evidence developed prior to the compelled testimony is obviously independent, trial courts face a difficult task in identifying whether
cant discipline of prosecutors is particularly noteworthy in cases in which prosecutors intentionally suppress evidence that leads to a reversal of a defendant’s conviction and a stinging rebuke by a
court of the prosecutor’s misconduct. Although one would realistically expect disciplinary agencies to proceed aggressively against such unscrupulous conduct, such is not the case.”); Rosen,
supra note 132, at 697 (“The results of this research demonstrate that despite the universal adoption by the states of Disciplinary Rules prohibiting prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence and falsification of evidence, and despite numerous reported cases showing violations of
these rules, disciplinary charges have been brought infrequently and meaningful sanctions rarely
applied.” (footnotes omitted)).
196
Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460.
197
Id. at 461–62.
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subsequently discovered evidence is tainted. Despite the Kastigar majority’s claim that prosecutors bear a “heavy burden” to prove proffered evidence was developed independently, it is relatively easy for a prosecutor to
manufacture innocent accounts for how evidence was discovered and quite
challenging for trial courts to see through such explanations. 198 An “informal
and undetected exchange of information” is almost impossible for a defendant to uncover. 199 Additionally, as Justice Marshall noted in his dissent:
[T]he paths of information through the investigative bureaucracy may well be long and winding, and even a prosecutor acting in the best of faith cannot be certain that
somewhere in the depths of his investigative apparatus, often including hundreds of employees, there was not some
prohibited use of the compelled testimony. 200
Although the Court may have faith in trial courts’ ability to discern fact
from fiction, evidence suggests that judges are either “unable to distinguish
carefully crafted lies from truth or . . . they err on the side of punishing a
culpable defendant, even if the police may have lied.” 201 Thus, the Kastigar
majority might have believed that trial courts provide “very substantial protection.” 202 But, in contrast to the Court’s belief, the reality for defendants is
that they are confronted with a doctrine that “leave[s] the witness ‘dependent for the preservation of his rights upon the integrity and good faith of the
prosecuting authorities.’” 203

198
See id. at 461–62 (declaring the responsibility of the prosecutor); id. at 469 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (“A witness who suspects that his compelled testimony was used to develop a lead will
be hard pressed indeed to ferret out the evidence necessary to prove it. And of course it is no answer to say he need not prove it, for though the Court puts the burden of proof on the government,
the government will have no difficulty in meeting its burden by mere assertion if the witness produces no contrary evidence.”).
199
See id. at 464 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (explaining that informal exchanges of information
are less of a concern when the compelled testimony occurs in a separate jurisdiction from the
prosecuting one).
200
Id. at 469 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
201
Melanie D. Wilson, Improbable Cause: A Case for Judging Police by a More Majestic
Standard, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 259, 263–64 (2010) (describing the results of a two-year
study of suppression hearings in the District of Kansas); see Laurie L. Levenson, Unnerving the
Judges: Judicial Responsibility for the Rampart Scandal, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 787, 790 (2001)
(describing how “judges unwittingly participate in police perjury and misconduct by not critically
examining police credibility” and that “judges appear to . . . ignor[e] telltale signs that police officers fabricate testimony to obtain convictions”).
202
Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 461.
203
Id. at 469 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 460 (majority opinion)).
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Much like Kastigar, the Wardlow decision was also built on the idea
that trial courts act as a backstop to ensure that evidence that is acquired
unconstitutionally is filtered out before trial. In addition to demonstrating
the Court’s belief that honest citizens need not fear the police, Wardlow operated on the presumption that courts could review the circumstances of the
arrest, which are typically related to the court by the arresting officer, and
make an accurate determination as to whether or not the police had the legal
authority to detain the suspect. 204 Yet, a number of studies raise doubts as to
whether such hearings effectively deter police misconduct. 205 First, there is
scant evidence that the requirement that officers testify under oath inhibits
the police from inventing facts which support either probable cause or reasonable suspicion. 206 Second, as with Kastigar, there is little evidence that
trial courts are either able or willing to identify instances when officers
lie. 207 Finally, even if trial courts were to disbelieve officer testimony, the
exclusion of evidence may not deter future misconduct. 208
Unlike Wardlow and Kastigar, Brady does not rely significantly on trial courts to help ensure that its constitutional dictates are followed. Arguably, however, the Brady Court’s belief that prosecutors would voluntarily
turn over evidence that might hurt their ability to obtain a conviction was
204
This presumption is also the foundation of the exclusionary rule and decisions like Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), which rely on trial
courts to hold hearings to determine whether evidence has been obtained unconstitutionally.
205
Morgan Cloud, Judges, “Testilying,” and the Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1341,
1355–56 (1996) (describing how “[a] number of empirical studies . . . suggest that perjured testimony by police officers is distressingly common” and “police officers commit perjury most often
to avoid suppression of evidence and to fabricate probable cause, knowing that judges ‘may wink’
at obvious police perjury in order to admit incriminating evidence” (footnotes omitted)); see Donald A. Dripps, Police, Plus Perjury, Equals Polygraphy, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 693, 698
(1996) (describing several studies concluding that the perjury by police officers was widespread).
206
See Dripps, supra note 205, at 693 (“Police perjury has been called ‘pervasive,’ ‘an integral feature of urban police work,’ and the ‘demon in the criminal process.’” (footnotes omitted));
Myron W. Orfield, Jr., The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago
Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016, 1050 (1987) (“Sixteen of twenty-one responding
officers (seventy-six percent) . . . agreed that the police do ‘shade the facts a little (or a lot) to
establish probable cause when there may not have been probable cause in fact.’”); Irving Younger,
The Perjury Routine, THE NATION, May 8, 1967, at 596 (“[E]ven if his lies are exposed in the
courtroom, the policeman is as likely to be indicted for perjury by his co‑worker, the prosecutor,
as he is to be struck down by thunderbolts from an avenging heaven.”). A famous study by Sarah
Barlow uncovered a substantial increase in officer testimony that drugs spontaneously “dropped”
from defendants’ pockets after the Supreme Court ruled in Mapp v. Ohio that unconstitutionally
obtained evidence had to be excluded from trial. Sarah Barlow, Patterns of Arrests for Misdemeanor Narcotics Possession: Manhattan Police Practices 1960–62, 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 549, 549
(1968).
207
See Cloud, supra note 205, at 1356 (indicating that “judges may ‘wink’ at obvious police
perjury in order to admit incriminating evidence” (internal quotations omitted) (footnote omitted)).
208
See supra notes 188–195 and accompanying text.
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buttressed by its expectation that appellate review would help keep prosecutors honest. Unfortunately, the Court’s decisions dictating the standard for
appellate review of alleged Brady violations have undermined, rather than
strengthened, the incentive for prosecutors to fulfill their Brady obligations.
The Court in Bagley held that defendants seeking to reverse their convictions must demonstrate that “there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.” 209 By obligating defendants to demonstrate, not only
that the prosecutor had failed to turn over evidence favorable to the accused, but that the production of such evidence was likely to have affected
the trial, the Court greatly reduced the likelihood that appellate review
would effectively deter prosecutors from ignoring their Brady obligations.
D. Faith in Overlapping Sources of Protection
It is possible that the Court’s faith in police and prosecutors is derived
from all three sources—the character of the actors who operate the criminal
justice system, the institutions within which they work, and the judiciary’s
ability to supervise and discipline individuals and organizations that fail to
follow the Court’s criminal procedure directives. Yet the very fact that there
exist multiple justifications for the Court’s presumption that police and prosecutors can be trusted may, perversely, undermine the legitimacy of that belief.
A number of scholars have highlighted the danger that overlapping
sources for ensuring accountability can result in a diffusion of responsibility
that invites abuse. 210 Thus, although it is possible that institutional controls
such as bar disciplinary committees, police internal review boards, and administrative supervision might complement judicial oversight over rogue
criminal justice actors, it seems equally likely that the multiple justifications
for trusting police and prosecutors increases, rather than diminishes, the
probability that police and prosecutors are ignoring their constitutional obligations. Indeed, the presumption that, except for “a few bad apples,” the
209
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); see supra notes 135–138 and accompanying text.
210
E.g., Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Produce
Too Little Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69, 91 (1995) (“The lack of enforcement may be
traced in part to the diffusion of regulatory authority. Standards of prosecutorial conduct are underenforced precisely because each of the various disciplinary authorities can justify relying on
others to carry the load.”); Bidish Sarma, Using Deterrence Theory to Promote Prosecutorial
Accountability, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 573, 619 (2017) (describing how “the diffusion [of
responsibility] produces inaction and finger-pointing”); Yaroshefsky, supra note 132, at 292 (“The
belief in judicial oversight, like the faith in the efficacy of internal controls, results in a lack of
accountability because disciplinary committees defer to courts and prosecutors’ systems of regulation. . . . [Moreover,] the lack of coordination between these institutions diminishes their responsiveness in taking necessary action.”).
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majority of prosecutors and police are of good moral character may explain
the relative paucity of prosecutorial disciplinary proceedings and the perceived failure of trial courts to regulate bad policing. 211
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S MISPLACED FAITH
If neither the individual nor collective explanations for trusting police
and prosecutors justify the “faith” embedded in the Supreme Court’s criminal procedure decisions, then the implications of perpetuating these “Doctrines of Faith” are significant for the criminal justice system. Part III of this
Article explores three questions. 212 First, if the Court’s faith in police and
prosecutors is misplaced, are the Court’s decisions that rely on those assumptions particularly vulnerable to narrowing by lower courts? 213 Second,
what do these cases suggest about the value of diverse viewpoints on the
federal bench? 214 Finally, what does the Court’s reliance on the good intentions of police and prosecutors means for the viability of court-led regulation of police and prosecutors? 215
A. Questioning the Court’s Precedents and Their Application
On a cold Boston evening on December 18, 2011, two police officers
observed Jimmy Warren, a black male, walking with an acquaintance near a
park. 216 Believing that Warren and his companion fit the very general description of two burglary suspects, the two officers approached to investigate, but before the officers could say more than, “Hey fellas,” Warren,
much like Freddie Gray, ran. 217 The officers pursued Mr. Warren, and, following a breathless foot chase, apprehended him after a brief struggle.218
The officers recovered a gun on the property not far from where Mr. Warren
was captured. 219 Prior to trial, Mr. Warren moved to suppress the firearm
211
See Cloud, supra note 205, at 1356 (indicating that police believe they can get away with
perjury); Green, supra note 210, at 89 (describing the “dearth of reported disciplinary proceedings”).
212
See infra notes 213–282 and accompanying text.
213
See infra notes 216–253 and accompanying text.
214
See infra notes 254–273 and accompanying text.
215
See infra notes 274–282 and accompanying text.
216
Commonwealth v. Warren, 58 N.E.3d 333, 336 (Mass. 2016).
217
Id. at 338, 339 (recapping the interactions between police and the supposed suspects, characterizing the description of the burglary suspects as “vague” and “bare-bones” and suggesting
that it “contribute[d] nothing to the officers’ ability to distinguish the defendant from any other
black male wearing dark clothes and a ‘hoodie’ in” the Roxbury neighborhood of Boston (citation
omitted)).
218
See id. at 337 (providing a minute-by-minute account of the arrest).
219
Id. at 337–38.
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and his statements arguing that the police lacked reasonable suspicion for
the stop. 220 The motion was denied and Mr. Warren was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm after a short bench trial. 221
The trial court’s refusal to suppress the gun was unsurprising. Mirroring the Supreme Court’s reasoning in its 2000 decision in Illinois v. Wardlow, Massachusetts state law at the time described “evasive” behavior in a
“high crime area” as relevant factors in evaluating reasonable suspicion.222
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, however, chose to examine the
factual assumptions that lay at the core of the Wardlow reasoning. 223 Citing
a Boston Police Department report that documented a pattern of racial profiling of black males in the city and statistics that black men were disproportionally targeted for repeat police encounters, the court explained that, in
light of current police practices, flight was “not necessarily probative of a
suspect’s state of mind or consciousness of guilt.” 224 Instead the court reversed the trial court’s finding of reasonable suspicion and stated that “the
finding that black males in Boston are disproportionately and repeatedly
targeted for [Field Interrogation and Observation] encounters suggests a
reason for flight totally unrelated to consciousness of guilt.” 225
The 2016 Warren decision involved state law but notably its reasoning
could easily be applied to Wardlow itself. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court did not eliminate flight as a factor in its reasonable suspicion
analysis. 226 Instead, the court recognized that the existing legal framework
was open to incorporating new empirical evidence about how the police and

220

Id. at 335–36.
Id.
222
See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (incorporating flight in a “high crime
area” as a relevant factor for a stop based on reasonable suspicion); Commonwealth v. Depina,
922 N.E.2d 778, 786 (Mass. 2010) (finding that “the defendant’s obvious effort to avoid encountering the police” supported a finding of reasonable suspicion); Commonwealth v. Stoute, 665
N.E.2d 93, 98 (Mass. 1996) (finding that the defendant’s “accelerated pace as he drew away from
the officers” and the fact that the area had a “very high” rate of crime were factors in determining
reasonable suspicion); Commonwealth v. Doocey, 778 N.E.2d 1023, 1028, 1029 (Mass. App. Ct.
2002) (factoring “the actions of the suspect upon the initial police encounter, including evasive or
unusual behavior” as well as whether the location was a “high crime area” in its determination of
reasonable suspicion). Although the Massachusetts precedents on reasonable suspicion reflect the
same language and reasoning as Wardlow, neither those cases, nor the Warren decision, cite
Wardlow directly.
223
See Warren, 58 N.E.3d at 341–42 (discussing the assumptions about flight).
224
Id. at 342.
225
Id. at 342-43.
226
Id. at 342.
221
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the public interact. 227 Although some trial courts may mistakenly assume
that Wardlow created a simple test requiring only a finding of flight in a
high crime area to establish reasonable suspicion, in fact, the decision did
not set forth such a rigid calculus. As a result, both state and federal courts
are free to incorporate a greater skepticism of the behavior of the police into
their own cases evaluating reasonable suspicion. Taking their cue from
Massachusetts, such courts would do well to consider recent reports detailing widespread police misconduct such as the Department of Justice’s investigation of the Ferguson Police Department and a similar report detailing
a pattern or practice of policing in Baltimore that violated the Constitution
and federal law. 228
While the framework for the Wardlow decision allows lower courts to
incorporate a less trusting view of the police into their analysis, the Supreme Court’s 1968 decision in Brady v. Maryland, appears less susceptible
to reform. Even if courts were to adopt a skeptical view of prosecutors, their
ability to ensure that exculpatory evidence is turned over remains limited. 229
Yet while the courts may struggle to identify Brady violations, they can do
more to encourage prosecutors to fully satisfy their Brady obligations.
The problem of prosecutors failing to turn over exculpatory evidence
was exacerbated by the Court’s decision to limit the obligation to evidence
that is deemed to be “material.” 230 Lower courts, however, may have to
shoulder some of the blame for the degree to which the materiality standard
has enticed prosecutors to withhold potentially exculpatory evidence. In his
dissent decrying the refusal of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to overturn a defendant’s conviction in spite of the prosecution’s failure to disclose
powerful impeachment evidence for a key State witness, Chief Judge Alex
Kozinski wrote, “By raising the materiality bar impossibly high, the panel
invites prosecutors to avert their gaze from exculpatory evidence, secure in
the belief that, if it turns up after the defendant has been convicted, judges
227

See id. (“Given this reality for black males in the city of Boston, a judge should, in appropriate cases, consider the report’s findings in weighing flight as a factor in the reasonable suspicion calculus.”)
228
See BALTIMORE DOJ REPORT, supra note 71, at 28–29 (describing unwarranted stops by
police); CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 15–24 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/
2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ERN8-ZKY5] (finding that
pattern of unwarranted stops and arrests erodes public trust in the police).
229
Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in Criminal
Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2088 (2016) (“[I]nformation gaps contribute to judges’ and
defense attorneys’ inability to detect Brady problems, because they will often not know about
exculpatory or impeaching information relevant to the case at hand even when such information
has been disclosed or revealed in some other setting.”).
230
See supra notes 122–142 and accompanying text.
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will dismiss the Brady violation as immaterial.” 231 If lower court judges
instead were to shift their calculus and require a stronger showing that the
failure to disclose could not have impacted the outcome of the trial, then
they might send the message Judge Kozinski hoped to convey: “Betray
Brady . . . and you will lose your ill-gotten conviction.” 232
In addition to increasing the required confidence level for immateriality, trial courts, reluctant to simply trust prosecutors to “do the right thing,”
might consider an innovative proposal by Professor Cynthia E. Jones to
provide juries with an adverse inference instruction when prosecutors fail to
meet their Brady obligations. 233
Generally, when Brady violations are discovered before or during the
course of trial, courts order disclosure, and, if necessary, grant the defense a
continuance. 234 This remedy, however, does little to counter the powerful
incentives prosecutors face to favor nondisclosure in close cases. Some
scholars have suggested that judges should simply dismiss cases whenever a
Brady violation occurs. 235 Courts, however, have largely resisted such
“drastic” sanctions and appellate courts have reversed some dismissals suggesting that Brady violations should, whenever possible, be remedied with
“less severe measures.” 236 It may simply be unrealistic to expect that courts
would regularly declare a mistrial when prosecutors fail to meet their discovery obligations. Such a decision would surely test the resolve of judges,
231

United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 633 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
Id.
233
See Cynthia E. Jones, A Reason to Doubt: The Suppression of Evidence and the Inference
of Innocence, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415, 451 (2010) (proposing the following jury
instruction, “Ladies and Gentlemen, [u]nder the United States Constitution, in order for the defendant to receive a fair trial, the government is required to inform the defense of any information
known to the government that tends to suggest the defendant might not have committed the
crime(s) charged as well as information that casts doubt on the credibility of the government’s
own evidence. In this case, the government intentionally withheld such evidence from the defense.
Specifically, the government failed to inform the defense that [ ]. In evaluating the merits of this
case, you can decide what weight, if any, to give to the government’s misconduct. The government’s actions, standing alone, or in combination with other facts presented in this case, may create a reasonable doubt in your mind about the defendant’s guilt.”) (alterations in original).
234
See, e.g., id. at 470–71 (offering an example of the minimal impact of the current remedies
of a Brady violation on the prosecution).
235
See, e.g., Michael D. Cicchini, Prosecutorial Misconduct at Trial: A New Perspective
Rooted in Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 335, 336 (2007)
(“[U]pon a finding of prosecutorial misconduct . . . [a] mistrial should be granted without any
judicial determination of whether the defendant would be found guilty absent the misconduct.”).
236
See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 467 N.E.2d 498, 501 (N.Y. 1984) (“Although the choice of
‘appropriate’ action is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, as a general matter the
drastic remedy of dismissal should not be invoked where less severe measures can rectify the
harm done by the loss of evidence.”); Jones, supra note 233, at 444 (explaining that “dismissal is a
‘disfavored’ or ‘drastic’ sanction that is rarely imposed” (footnote omitted)).
232
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who would be forced to decide whether to dismiss without prejudice, which
would waste judicial resources and could disadvantage the defendant, or to
dismiss with prejudice and perhaps allow a guilty party to go free. An adverse inference charge, however, would allow judges concerned about prosecutors’ failure to satisfy their Brady obligations to increase the pressure on
prosecutors to disclose potential exculpatory information without requiring
judges to expose themselves to reversal or to shoulder responsibility for an
allegedly guilty party escaping justice. Moreover, an instruction hampering
prosecutors’ ability to obtain a conviction at trial may be a greater incentive
to fulfill their Brady obligations than the threat of a reversal from an appellate court years later. 237
Finally, courts can do more to determine whether the Supreme Court’s
faith that prosecutors will reliably disclose favorable evidence to the accused is warranted. Some judges have suggested that “[t]here is an epidemic
of Brady violations abroad in the land.” 238 Despite this suggestion, there
have been only limited efforts to develop systemic data about the scope and
breadth of the disease. Although judges are ostensibly tasked with safeguarding the entire judicial process, their role is generally transactional;
each case, and even individual discovery issues, tend to be viewed in isolation and on a literal case-by-case basis. 239 Yet, as Professor Andrew Manuel
Crespo has noted, trial courts are in the position to gather a wealth of data
about what is actually happening at the ground level of the criminal justice
system. 240 The Superior Court of the District of Columbia has already begun to develop a database of “digitized Brady disclosures . . . through formal electronic docket entries, informal emailed submissions to the ‘chambers file,’ as well as digitally transcribed colloquies in open court.” 241 Such
237

See Jones, supra note 233, at 451 (discussing the potential impact of a Brady instruction).
Olsen, 737 F.3d at 626 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
239
See Crespo, supra note 229, at 2057 (describing the critique that courts approach the administration of the criminal justice system through the adjudication of individual cases and lack a
“holistic picture of how the criminal justice system operates”); Tracey L. Meares, Programming
Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82
U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 164 (2015) (suggesting that courts effectively examine individual incidents to
determine the admissibility of evidence but are less capable at assessing the broader implications
of policing strategies that can have a substantial impact on the population being policed); Daphna
Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1039, 1056
(2016) (“Fourth Amendment law has developed few tools to put . . . [the] pieces together, to see a
whole greater than the sum of its parts.”)
240
See Crespo, supra note 229, at 2090 (“Criminal courts thus often wind up in possession of
considerable caches of digitized disclosures that, taken together, form a broad knowledge base of
potential Brady information, which prosecutors or defense attorneys could easily search to check
the accuracy of the representations (or silences) made in subsequent cases.”).
241
Id. at 2089–90.
238
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efforts expanded on the efforts of the public defender’s office in that jurisdiction, which had been compiling digital copies of witness testimony with
digital annotations by its attorneys. 242 By gathering system-wide facts about
Brady violations, lower courts can effectively test the Supreme Court’s faith
that “a prosecutor anxious about tacking too close to the wind” will reliably
disclose exculpatory evidence. 243
As with Brady violations, trial courts and defendants are ill-equipped
to identify instances when a defendant’s testimony induced under Kastigar
v. United States has infected his or her trial. 244 Nevertheless, by requiring
prosecutors to commit themselves to certain safeguards in advance of trial,
trial courts may be able to ameliorate some of the dangers posed by the
prosecution’s employment of use and derivative use immunity.
It was notable that the surprise announcement that the Baltimore State’s
Attorney’s Office was dismissing the remaining charges against the officers
charged in the death of Freddie Gray was made on the morning the court had
scheduled the Kastigar hearing for Officer Miller. 245 While the prosecution
had established a “clean team” of prosecutors who ostensibly lacked
knowledge of the compelled testimony, defense attorneys had been prepared
to argue that the lead prosecutor had tainted the team by communicating with
the clean team prosecutors as they prepared for trial. 246 Indeed, Chief Deputy
State’s Attorney Michael Schatzow, who was on the original prosecution
team, denied the clean team was tainted, but he subsequently admitted that he
had communicated with the clean team on multiple occasions. 247
Kastigar itself may have contributed to the defense and the prosecution’s disagreement over the propriety of the prosecutor’s communications
with the clean team. Kastigar described the state’s burden as proving that
242

Id. at 2090.
See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995) (perpetuating the Court’s belief in the
prosecutor as an inherently good actor).
244
See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 469 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“A
witness who suspects that his compelled testimony was used to develop a lead will be hard pressed
indeed to ferret out the evidence necessary to prove it.”); Bowers, supra note 97, at 169 (“[T]hose
jurisdictions that have carefully examined the practicality of the derivative use immunity doctrine
have found it does not work in practice.”).
245
Saliqa Khan, State Drops Charges Against Officers in Freddie Gray Case, WBALTV
(July 29, 2016), http://www.wbaltv.com/article/state-drops-charges-against-officers-in-freddiegray-case/7101967 [https://perma.cc/F5K4-AXRM].
246
Justin Fenton, Prosecutors in Freddie Gray Case Maintain They Had Evidence to Convict
Officers, BALT. SUN (July 28, 2016), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/
bs-md-ci-freddie-gray-prosecutors-speak-20160728-story.html [https://web.archive.org/web/2018
0908040024/http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-freddie-grayprosecutors-speak-20160728-story.html].
247
Id.
243
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all of the evidence it proposed to use was derived from “legitimate independent sources.” 248 Left unsaid was the degree to which the government
could use the coerced testimony for things other than deriving admissible
evidence. While several lower courts have held that the government’s burden is not simply to introduce independent evidence but to demonstrate that
the coerced testimony has not influenced such things as trial strategy, the
decision to initiate a prosecution, the plea offer, and a myriad of other nonevidentiary issues, the prosecutor took a far narrower view of his Kastigar
obligations. 249 When asked about his discussions with the “clean team,” Mr.
Schatzow simply stated, “There was no requirement that we not be allowed
to talk to people.” 250
The Chief Deputy State’s Attorney’s statement is indicative of one of
the failings of Kastigar and of one way skeptical courts can better protect
defendants. Compelling testimony under Kastigar is surprisingly straightforward—prosecutors have no obligation to describe how they plan to utilize the testimony or what safeguards they intend to employ to ensure that
the compelled testimony does not adversely affect the defendant. 251 Instead
of asking prosecutors to give post hoc explanations for how evidence was
derived, trial courts should, when possible, set forth clear expectations
about the safeguards prosecutors are expected to adopt. Such safeguards
could include physical restrictions on access to the recorded testimony, including “records of persons to whom access was granted and the purpose
for which the testimony was examined.” 252 Any communication between
individuals with knowledge of the testimony and the prosecuting attorneys
could be recorded and provided to the court for in camera review. Moreo248

Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 461.
See, e.g., United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 311 (8th Cir. 1973) (including “assistance in focusing the investigation, deciding to initiate prosecution, refusing to plea-bargain, interpreting evidence, planning cross-examination, and otherwise generally planning trial strategy” in
its definition of improper use of compelled testimony).
250
See WJZ-13 CBS Baltimore, Lead Prosecutors Break Silence on Freddie Gray Trials,
YOUTUBE (July 28, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rbK2H4HYNJQ [https://perma.
cc/U8AJ-MWJY] (answering reporters’ questions alongside Deputy State’s Attorney, Janice
Bledsoe).
251
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-123 (West 2018) (empowering prosecutors to compel testimony with few other guidelines).
252
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 726
(1997), https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-726-steps-avoid-taint [https://
perma.cc/2B54-ZK2A] (“[P]rosecutors should take the following precautions in the case of a
witness who may possibly be prosecuted for an offense about which the witness may be questioned during his/her compelled testimony: . . . . Ensure that the witness’s immunized testimony is
recorded verbatim and thereafter maintained in a secure location to which access is documented
. . . .”); Jefferson Keenan, Nonevidentiary Use of Compelled Testimony and the Increased Likelihood
of Conviction, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 173, 190 (1990) (discussing a variety of protective measures).
249
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ver, prosecutors should commit themselves to those safeguards prior to the
issuance of an order to compel. Some scholars have suggested that the prosecutor should be required to “swear that he has not had access to privileged
testimony or to any information derived from it” when trying a witness who
has previously testified under a grant of immunity. 253 Although such a requirement may be productive, pre-committing the prosecution to certain affirmative safeguards may be more effective at ensuring that compelled testimony does not infect the defendant’s trial and that prosecutors are not tempted to cover for communications that may have created unintentional taint.
B. The Need for Diverse Viewpoints on the Courts
Ultimately, the Court’s Criminal Doctrines of Faith are grounded in
empirical presumptions about how police and prosecutors behave.254
Whether the Justices who authored those decisions premised their assumptions on their belief in the strong personal character of police and prosecutors, the effectiveness of administrative checks on misbehavior, or the judiciary’s ability to identify and deter misconduct, the question must be asked:
Why did the Court believe them?
One explanation is that the faith in police and prosecutors evidenced in
the Court’s majority opinions was shaped, in part, by the Justices’ own personal and cultural experience with the criminal justice system. 255 As United
States District Judge Edward M. Chen has observed, “[J]udges draw upon
the breadth and depth of their own life experience, upon the knowledge and
understanding of people, and of human nature . . . inevitably, one’s ethnic
and racial background contributes to those life experiences.” 256 Because no
253

See, e.g., Keenan, supra note 252 (“[P]rosecution staff must swear that they have neither
acquired nor attempted to acquire knowledge of the substance of the immunized testimony.”);
Note, Standards for Exclusion in Immunity Cases After Kastigar and Zicarelli, 82 YALE L.J. 171,
186 (1972) (discussing the pros and cons of an oath regarding lack of access).
254
See Stoughton, supra note 10, at 850 (describing the Court’s use of legislative facts in
cases involving the police to make assumptions about the police). See generally Allison Orr
Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255 (2012) (describing the
plethora of Supreme Court decisions that turn on “legislative facts” identified by the Justices).
255
See Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Identity Matters: The Case of Judge Constance Baker Motley,
117 COLUM. L. REV. 1691, 1693 (2017) (“Whether and how identity shapes judging is an enduring question and a high-stakes proposition, given the tremendous power that judges wield.”);
Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence, 57
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405, 468–69 (2000) (“An important step in accepting this exercise of judicial representation lies in acknowledging that white judges also function as representatives. They
articulate, engage and affirm narratives with which they are familiar and with which they share
with their constituent communities.”).
256
Edward M. Chen, The Judiciary, Diversity, and Justice for All, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1109,
1120 (2003); see Harry T. Edwards, Race and the Judiciary, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 325, 329
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single or even primary cultural perspective exists, it is important not to “essentialize” a particular community. 257 But it is beyond debate that people of
color experience the criminal justice system very differently than whites. 258
It is thus worth exploring whether a more diverse bench might produce a
more balanced view of how police and prosecutors actually act. 259
Utah v. Strieff, decided in 2016, provides a striking example of both
the advantages and the limits of seeking to improve judicial decisionmaking by increasing the diversity of the bench. 260 The author of the majority decision, Justice Clarence Thomas, found that Officer Fackrell had
simply made “two good-faith mistakes” and that there was “no indication
that this unlawful stop was part of any systemic or recurrent police misconduct.” 261 Justice Thomas gives lie to the claim that a judge of color will
necessarily incorporate the prevailing concerns of the racial group with
which he or she identifies. 262 Yet, Justice Sotomayor’s scathing dissent, directly challenging the majority’s faith in the motivations of the officer and the
broader practices of police departments across the country, was shaped by her
own personal perspectives as a Latina woman. 263 Justice Sotomayor’s recog(2002) (“[Judicial diversity] is good because it is inevitable that judges’ different professional and
life experiences have some bearing on how they confront various problems that come before
them.”).
257
Ifill, supra note 255, at 414 (“[D]iversity advocates need not, and indeed should not, argue
that the African American community is monolithic in its configuration, views, or values, or that
only one ‘black perspective’ exists. Essentializing African American communities or judges denies the richness and complexity of African American political thought.”).
258
See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing TANEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME (2015); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM
CROW 95–136 (2010); JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME (1963); W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE
SOULS OF BLACK FOLK (1903) (explaining that “it is no secret that people of color are disproportionate victims of . . . [suspicionless stops]” and describing how “black and brown parents have
given their children ‘the talk’—instructing them never to run down the street; always keep your
hands where they can be seen; do not even think of talking back to a stranger—all out of fear of
how an officer with a gun will react to them”).
259
See James Andrew Wynn, Jr. & Eli Paul Mazur, Judicial Diversity: Where Independence
and Accountability Meet, 67 ALB. L. REV. 775, 781–82 (2004) (“More important than a perception
of bias, however, is that the absence of diversity creates (in fact) a judicial partiality to the values
and stories of the groups overrepresented—white men—in its midst.”).
260
See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2063 (holding the evidence discovered was admissible).
261
Id.
262
See Kevin R. Johnson & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, A Principled Approach to the Quest for
Racial Diversity on the Judiciary, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 5, 13–14 (2004) (noting that Justice
Thomas “writes with a distinctively African American voice” but “has a conservative perspective
with which many African Americans disagree”).
263
See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2068, 2069 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Most striking about the
Court’s opinion is its insistence that the event here was ‘isolated,’ with ‘no indication that this
unlawful stop was part of any systemic or recurrent police misconduct.’ Respectfully, nothing
about this case is isolated.” (citation omitted)). Justice Sotomayor has openly embraced the idea
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nition that “suspicionless” stops were not a rare act of negligence, but rather
the product of police training and deliberate strategy, challenged the majority’s view of how police operate in street encounters. 264 Justice Sotomayor’s
fresh perspective was not limited to her views on how police officers actually behave. Her dissent described the trauma that unlawful detentions and
searches have on their victims, recognized the connection between the specific stop at issue in the case with the broader issues of racial profiling, and
called attention to the perception that “black and brown parents” need to
warn their children that the police may be a danger to them. 265
The Court’s lack of professional diversity may also contribute to its
uncritical view of police and prosecutors. Since 1975, the number of former
prosecutors on the Supreme Court has more than tripled. 266 As of today,
seven of the nine Justices have prior prosecutorial experience. 267 Although
those Justices with such experience undoubtedly bring a valuable practical
perspective to the Court’s deliberations, “[t]heir experiences are all of apiece:
years spent advocating with earnestness and vigor on behalf of the interests
of law enforcement, in the always challenging struggle to contain and combat crime.” 268 In an editorial titled, “The Homogenous Federal Bench,” the
New York Times Editorial Board decried the lack of professional diversity
among federal judges, arguing that even under the Obama administration
judicial nominees were “drawn overwhelmingly from the ranks of prosecutors and corporate lawyers” and that “[t]his deprives the courts of crucial
perspectives and reduces public trust in the justice system.” 269 The Court,
and indeed the entire federal judiciary, currently lacks judges who have advocated on behalf of those who have “seen policemen from the nightstick

that her decisions would be informed by her cultural experiences. See Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina
Judge’s Voice, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 87, 92 (2002).
264
Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2069 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“I do not doubt that most officers
act in ‘good faith’ and do not set out to break the law. That does not mean these stops are ‘isolated
instance[s] of negligence,’ however . . . . [M]any are the product of institutionalized training procedures”).
265
See id. at 2069–70 (detailing extensively the humiliations endured by the targets of “suspicionless stops” and how entire communities are raised in the shadow of this police practice).
266
Andrew Manuel Crespo, Regaining Perspective: Constitutional Criminal Adjudication in
the U.S. Supreme Court, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1985, 1987 (2016).
267
Id. at 1995.
268
Id. at 2000 (citation omitted).
269
Editorial, The Homogeneous Federal Bench, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2014), https://nyti.ms/
1iwbG6b [https://perma.cc/4ZQ9-P2Q3]; see Elizabeth Warren, The Corporate Capture of the
Federal Courts, 17 U. D.C. L. REV. 4, 6 (2014) (“According to a study published by the American
Constitution Society, as of 2008, the federal appellate bench was ‘dominated by judges whose
previous professional experience is generally corporate or prosecutorial.’” (footnote omitted)).
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end.” 270 Thus, it is hardly surprising that the doctrines shaped by those
judges tend to reflect a lack of skepticism about the ways in which police
and prosecutors behave.
One need not accept Justice Sotomayor’s account in Strieff to recognize that judicial decision-making is improved when a variety of voices and
perspectives are included in the deliberative process. 271 If the Court’s criminal procedure decisions have been marked by a bias in favor of police and
prosecutors, part of the explanation and some of the solution likely lies in
the diversity of the Court. A diverse bench ensures “that a single set of values or views do not dominate judicial decision-making.” 272 To the extent
that multiple perspectives challenge the benign assumptions the Court has
traditionally made about the police and prosecutors, a more diverse Court
may lead to doctrines that are more skeptical of the criminal justice system
and more protective of civil liberties. 273
C. Losing Faith in the Courts
For the last half century, the primary approach to regulating the criminal justice system and its actors has been to rely on the Constitution and the
courts to establish threshold standards to prevent abuse. 274 Some scholars
270

Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
409 (1974) (considering the influence on perspective of dealing with the police as adversary); see
ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, BROADENING THE BENCH: PROFESSIONAL DIVERSITY AND JUDICIAL
NOMINATIONS 4 (“As this report details, the federal judiciary is currently lacking in judges with
experience (a) working for public interest organizations; (b) as public defenders or indigent criminal defense attorneys; and (c) representing individual clients—like employees, consumers, or
personal injury plaintiffs—in private practice.”); Crespo, supra note 250, at 2001 (citing Amsterdam, supra) (discussing how the Court could reverse its homogeneity).
271
See Edwards, supra note 256, at 329 (describing how diversity on the bench leads to more
informed discussions and better outcomes); Nancy Scherer, Diversifying the Federal Bench: Is
Universal Legitimacy for the U.S. Justice System Possible?, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 587, 590 (2011)
(“[D]iversity ensures that more voices are heard in the decision making process.”).
272
Ifill, supra note 255, at 411.
273
See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2071 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (characterizing the experiences
of people of color in the criminal justice system as the “canaries in the coal mine” and declaring
that “unlawful police stops corrode all our civil liberties and threaten all our lives”).
274
David M. Jaros, Preempting the Police, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1149, 1150 (2014) (describing the
reliance on the courts to regulate law enforcement); see Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme
Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 790 (1970) (arguing
that the “lack of legislative and executive attention to the problems of police treatment of suspects
. . . forces the Court into the role of lawmaker in this area”); Harmon, supra note 8, at 763 (“The
problem of regulating police power through law has been shoehorned into the narrow confines of
constitutional criminal procedure.”); Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s Misguided Call for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 747 (2005)
(“Since the criminal procedure revolution of the Warren Court era, the courts have been the primary rule makers in the field of criminal procedure.”).
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have suggested that the courts are ill-suited for this role and that, in the absence of judicial intervention, the other branches might have done a better
job at curtailing misconduct. 275 Several scholars have focused on the courts’
inability to develop flexible rules and their limited capacity to respond to
rapidly changing circumstances such as when technological advances
change the parameters of what law enforcement is able to do. 276 Other
scholars have challenged the courts’ “inaccurate empirical conclusions” and
“flawed normative arguments about both rights and remedies.” 277 Although
there remains the hope that the Supreme Court will develop a more balanced perspective, its historic inclination to assume the best of police and
prosecutors may be further evidence that it would be beneficial if other institutions took on the difficult task of restraining criminal justice actors who
abuse their discretion.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to attempt to describe what kind
of rules and regimes the legislature and the executive branch might develop
if they were to assume a more active role in policing the criminal justice
system. Moreover, there remains the very real risk that placing a greater
burden on the judiciary’s sister branches to curb misconduct will diffuse
responsibility and result in even less effective oversight. 278 It may be, however, that recognizing the courts’ persistent bias in favor of police and prosecutors will help to counter the other branches’ tendency to cede responsibility for police and prosecutorial misconduct to the judiciary.
Given the underlying bias in the courts’ criminal procedure decisions,
the judiciary’s most productive role may be one that prods the other branches
of government to take responsibility for developing effective rules and sys-

275
See David A. Sklansky, Quasi-Affirmative Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure,
88 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1295 (2002) (suggesting that several seminal criminal procedure decisions
“may have slowed legislative innovation by a kind of informal preemption, occupying the field
and providing a single, pre-approved solution”); Stuntz, supra note 8, at 792 (“The Court drove
legislators, along with the dollars they control, away from those areas where legislation might
have done the most good (policing and procedure), and into those areas where it is bound to do the
most harm (crime definition and sentencing).”).
276
See Stuntz, supra note 8, at 785 (suggesting that criminal procedure law should be radically restructured to allow for flexibility and innovation). See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth
Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 801, 857–81 (2004) (arguing that it is difficult for the Court to adopt a flexible rule under the
Fourth Amendment and describing the advantages that legislatures have when it comes to regulating police activity involving new technologies).
277
See, e.g., Harmon, supra note 8, at 775, 776 (arguing that because of these “institutional
deficiencies, constitutional rights are not enforced to their ‘full conceptual boundaries’” (footnote
omitted)).
278
See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
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tems that will adequately protect the public. 279 While the courts, for decades,
have been viewed as setting the outermost limits of what police and prosecutors may do, some have suggested that their most useful function has been to
invite the other branches to more closely consider which policies they should
adopt. 280 The “politics of crime” may discourage politicians from attempting
to curb police and prosecutorial abuses. 281 When prodded to action, however,
the political process may be more likely to uncover embedded biases and alternative perspectives than the judiciary has been able to thus far.
Should the Supreme Court, however, continue to play a substantial role
in prescribing rules that shape police and prosecutorial behavior, the extent
to which the Justices recognize and question the assumptions they make
about how police and prosecutors behave will likely determine the effectiveness of the safeguards they design. In many respects, this examination
of the Court’s assumptions may have been what Justice Sotomayor was urging when she argued:
We must not pretend that the countless people who are routinely
targeted by police are “isolated.” They are the canaries in the coal
mine whose deaths, civil and literal, warn us that no one can
breathe in this atmosphere. They are the ones who recognize that
unlawful police stops corrode all our civil liberties and threaten
all our lives. Until their voices matter too, our justice system will
continue to be anything but. 282
By questioning its faith in the police and prosecutors, the Supreme Court has
the capacity to restore the public’s faith in both the Court and its doctrines.
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See, e.g., Jaros, supra note 274, at 1152–53 (advocating for state courts to use the preemption doctrine to prod legislatures to provide greater guidance about police activities that the legislatures condone by forcing those legislatures to explicitly endorse or ban questionable police practices).
280
See id. at 1195 (“By prodding the legislature to either limit or affirmatively sanction police
conduct, courts can help ensure that the interests of the disenfranchised are at least debated in a
public forum.”); Sklansky, supra note 275, at 1296 (arguing that “reasonableness review under the
Fourth Amendment may well encourage the political branches to think harder about, and to articulate, the grounds for the search and seizure policies they adopt”).
281
See Jaros, supra note 274, at 1151 (“Unfortunately, although egregious cases of police
misconduct can temporarily galvanize the public and, for a short time, their representatives, the
politics of crime tends to deter politicians from taking an active role in limiting police power.”).
282
Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2071 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (urging a reexamination of the
Court’s precedent on suspicionless stops).
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CONCLUSION
The death of Freddie Gray, the subsequent federal investigation of the
Baltimore City Police Department, and the battles between the States’ Attorney’s office, the six defendants, and the officers who investigated the
circumstances of Mr. Gray’s fatal injury suggest that the Court’s faith in
police and prosecutors may be misplaced. Coupled with other high profile
incidents of police and prosecutorial error and misconduct, the Freddie
Gray cases indicate that the Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence is ripe
for reconsideration. The Court’s failure to recognize that criminal justice
actors do not always “do the right thing” is also evidence of the need for a
diverse bench to ensure that such assumptions are effectively interrogated.
Finally, the Court’s reliance on the good intentions of police and prosecutors suggest that it may be dangerous to rely solely upon the judiciary to
prevent police and prosecutorial abuse and that the Court’s most useful
function may be to prod the other branches of government into taking a
greater role in regulating law enforcement actors.

